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The Strange Career of the
Three-Judge District Court:
Federalism and Civil Rights,
1954–1976
Michael E. Solimine† & James L. Walker††
Abstract
The three-judge district court has had a long and strange career in
the history of the federal court system. Congress created the court in
1910 as a response to the canonical decision of Ex parte Young two
years earlier, which permitted federal court suits against state officials
to facilitate constitutional challenges to state laws. The three-judge
court statute was a reaction by Progressive Era politicians to such
perceived judicial overreach, and required any such challenges to be
brought before a specially convened trial court of three judges, with a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court available. First established as a
presumed limit on judicial activism, decades later, plaintiffs in the Civil
Rights Era came to see the court as advancing their agenda. Particularly in the South, some plaintiffs preferred to have their suits decided
by three judges rather than the usual one, with a direct appeal available
to a relatively friendly Warren Court. For that and other reasons, the
total number of such cases in the district courts, and direct appeals to
the Supreme Court, swelled in the 1960s and 1970s. But at the same
time, the court came to be seen by many as administratively burdensome and unnecessary, and Congress in 1976 severely restricted the
jurisdiction of the court, limiting it to hearing only reapportionment
cases.
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Analysis of the three-judge district court has so far largely relied on
anecdotal evidence, and limited empirical studies, to examine whether
some plaintiffs in the Civil Rights Era were correct to consider the court
as friendly to their interests, as compared to a typical single district
judge with the normal appeal process. This article breaks new ground
and extends those studies by systematically reexamining these assumptions through a unique, nationwide database of 885 three-judge district
court decisions, regarding constitutional challenges to state laws,
handed down from 1954 (the start of the Warren Court) to 1976 (when
Congress limited the Court’s jurisdiction). The study provides greater
and more complete information on the number, types and results of
cases litigated in the court, as well as on the dispositions of appeals to
the Supreme Court. Among our findings are that such court decisions
were disproportionately in favor of plaintiffs, both in and outside the
South, and that there was a high rate of appeal to the Supreme Court.
We then consider how the decisions of the three-judge court, and its
direct appeal mechanism, affected jurisprudential developments in
several areas of civil rights litigation, including reapportionment and
judicial abstention. We also address how these decisions impact the
Judicial Capacity model, which posits that the sheer number of cases
that come to the Court for review affects doctrinal developments. The
study situates the three-judge district court in a richer historical context, and sheds light on the continued use of the court in more limited
contexts to the present day.
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Introduction
Legal scholars have long examined federal courts’ exercise of judicial review, which at its core is the judicial determination of whether a
federal statute violates the U.S. Constitution. Such review of lawmaking
by a coordinate branch of government raises both counter-majoritarian
and separation-of-powers concerns.1 Similarly, legal scholarship has long
examined how federal courts have judicially reviewed statutes passed
by the States. That too raises counter-majoritarian concerns, but few,
if any, issues from separation of powers.2 Instead, the latter is replaced
by federalism concerns, the power of the federal government to supervise and possibly overturn the actions of state governments.3
This all covers familiar territory. What is possibly less familiar is
that, over the course of American history, federal courts have taken
different institutional paths in examining state statutes. Consider one
recent high-profile example of federal courts reviewing and holding state
statutes unconstitutional. In Obergefell v. Hodges,4 a majority of the
Supreme Court held that state same-sex marriage bans violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 While the bans of
only four states were before the Court in consolidated cases, the Court
effectively invalidated the similar bans of over thirty other states.6 The
cases came to the Court through the unexceptional process of a civil
rights action filed in a U.S. District Court before one judge, with review

1.

Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the
Legislative Process, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1915, 1926–1927 (2011).

2.

Stefanie A. Lindquist & Pamela C. Corley, National Policy Preferences
and Judicial Review of State Statutes at the United States Supreme Court,
43 PUBLIUS 151, 153–54 (2013).

3.

See id. at 152–53.

4.

576 U.S. 644 (2015).

5.

Id. at 675.

6.

Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality,
43 Hastings Const. L.Q. 243, 247 n.13 (2015).
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thereafter by a three-judge panel on a U.S. Court of Appeals, and by
the Supreme Court through a discretionary writ of certiorari.7
But the path of such litigation would have been quite different had
it been filed during a long period in the 20th century. Had it been
litigated between 1910 and 1976, such suits would have been heard
before specially convened three-judge district courts, consisting of the
district judge before whom the case was originally filed, and two other
judges appointed by the Chief Judge of the circuit, typically another
district judge and a circuit judge.8 Any review of the decision of that
three-judge panel would be by direct appeal to the Supreme Court,9
which at least ostensibly would be required to decide that appeal on its
merits. A high-profile example of its use to invalidate many state laws,
as a counterpoint to Obergefell, is the Court’s 1973 decision on state
abortion laws, Roe v. Wade.10
This article focuses on that less familiar story. Part I begins by
describing the long and strange11 career of the three-judge district court.
Congress created the court in 1910 as a response to the thencontroversial, now-iconic Supreme court decision of Ex parte Young.12
That decision permitted federal court suits against state officials to
challenge the constitutionality of state laws.13 The three-judge district
court was a reaction by Progressive Era politicians to the perceived
judicial overreach of cases like Ex parte Young, requiring such important suits to be decided by three judges, rather than just one, and for
the Supreme Court to be able to promptly hear any appeal.14 First established as an intended limit on conservative judicial activism, decades
7.

For discussions of the lower court litigation that preceded and culminated
in Obergefell, see generally id. at 282–323; Emily Buss, The Divisive Supreme
Court, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 73, 75.

8.

See infra Part I.

9.

David P. Currie, The Three Judge District Court in Constitutional
Litigation, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1964).

10.

410 U.S. 113, 121, 166 (1973).

11.

We say “strange,” here and in the title to the Article, to reference some
counterintuitive aspects of the court, including that it came to be seen as
friendly to plaintiffs, contrary to the intentions of the Congress that created
it. In doing so we channel the classic study, C. Vann Woodward, The
Strange Career of Jim Crow (1955). We thank David Stebenne for
suggesting the analogy. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career
of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1967-2007, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 667,
674–77 (2008) (also borrowing from Woodward's title in discussing
Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which, among other things, set
up a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia to hear certain
aspects of preclearance litigation under Section 5).

12.

209 U.S. 123 (1908).

13.

Id. at 161–62.

14.

See infra text accompanying notes 22–36.
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later, plaintiffs in the Civil Rights Era came to see the court as advancing their agenda. Particularly in the South, some plaintiffs preferred to
have their suits decided by three judges, rather than just one possibly
hostile judge, with a direct appeal available to a presumably friendly
Warren Court.15 For these and other reasons, the total number of cases
before three-judge district courts, and direct appeals to the Supreme
Court, swelled in the 1960s and 1970s.16 But at the same time, the court
came to be seen by many as administratively burdensome and unnecessary, and Congress in 1976 restricted the jurisdiction of the court to
reapportionment cases.17 Part I concludes by addressing the relatively
little empirical work that has examined the decision-making by and the
results of three-judge district court cases.
As described in Part II, this Article breaks new ground and extends
prior studies by systematically examining the assumptions of litigation
before three-judge district courts through a nationwide database of 885
decisions from those courts that we collected. We focused on the
beginning of the modern Civil Rights Era in 1954 (corresponding to the
beginning of the Warren Court) to 1976 (when Congress acted to
severely restrict the court’s jurisdiction). As reported in Part II, our
study provides greater and more complete information on the number,
types, and results of cases litigated in the court, as well as on the dispositions of appeals to the Supreme Court. Among our findings are that
such court decisions were disproportionately in favor of plaintiffs, both
in and outside the South, and that there was a high rate of appeal to
the Supreme Court.
Part III steps back to consider what difference, if any, the threejudge court, and its direct appeal mechanism, affected jurisprudential
developments in civil rights and civil liberties18 litigation in the time
studied. Would such litigation have been decided, both in lower courts
and in the Supreme Court, more-or-less the same in the absence of the
three-judge court? Or did the institution of the court have effects on
the substance and timing of decisions that possibly would have been
15.

See generally infra Part I.

16.

See infra text accompanying note 78.

17.

See infra note 59 and accompanying text.

18.

This Article addresses both “civil rights” and “civil liberties” cases. The
former term usually refers to unequal treatment claims against government
action, notably under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the latter term typically refers to limits on government power,
like those found in the Bill of Rights. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Divide, 12 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Libs.
1, 3 (2016). As we discuss below, both types of claims were litigated before
the three-judge district court during the modern Civil Rights Era. Nonetheless, as reflected in the title of the Article, for convenience we typically
only use “civil rights” to refer to both types of claims. We do not use that
term to cover other suits in federal court, like those under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, that are sometimes referred to as civil-rights actions.
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different had the three-judge district court not existed? To provide
some answers to those questions, we address two important areas of law
in the period we study: reapportionment and judicial abstention. We
also address how direct appeals of these cases impact the Judicial
Capacity model, which posits that the sheer number of cases that come
to the Supreme Court for review affects the substance of the doctrines
developed by the Court.
The final section of Part III, and the conclusion, suggest some
lessons that can be drawn from the history of the three-judge district
court for the present operation of the federal court system.

I.

Congress, Courts, Litigants, and the Three-Judge
District Court

This Part of the Article sets out the background for our empirical
study. We first address the history of the three-judge district court,
focusing on its creation, and subsequent modifications, by Congress and
its application by federal courts. We then turn to the use of the court
by plaintiffs and their lawyers pursuing civil rights claims, especially
during the Warren Court, and the initial years of the Burger Court,
from 1954 till 1976. We close this Part by summarizing the relatively
limited systematic studies that have heretofore been done on decisionmaking by such courts during the years in question.
A. The History of the Three-Judge District Court

The long-standing tradition of Anglo-American jurisprudence is for
trial courts, with rare exceptions, to consist of a single judge (sometimes
with a jury empaneled), with review thereafter to multimember appellate courts.19 This norm was reflected in the United States in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the lower federal courts.20 In
the following century, federal judges sometimes sat on multimember
“circuit courts,” but those were eventually abolished not long after the
creation of the Courts of Appeals in 1891.21
The creation of the modern three-judge district court in 1910 was
a distinct exception to the single-judge tradition.22 The passage of that
19.

Currie, supra note 9, at 1.

20.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–3, 1 Stat. 73, 73–74.

21.

See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J.
Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal
Courts & the Federal System 29–30 (7th ed. 2015); Currie, supra
note 9, at 2. See generally Jonathan Nash & Michael G. Collins, The
Certificate of Division and the Early Supreme Court, 94 S. Cal. L. Rev.
733 (2021).

22.

Fallon et al., supra note 21, at 31. Prior to 1910 Congress twice created
three-judge district courts, with direct appeals to the Supreme Court, to
hear certain specialized cases. In 1903 Congress established the court to
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law was the culmination of Congressional reaction to Supreme Court
decisions that struck down a variety of state regulatory laws passed
during the Progressive Era.23 One especially notorious decision, though
by no means the only one, was Ex parte Young.24 That decision held
that a Minnesota law regulating railroad rates, similar to the laws of
over a dozen other states, was unconstitutional on Due Process grounds,
affirming the decision of a federal district judge. But more importantly,
it entered the federal courts canon by permitting the railroads to
proactively attack the law in federal court and seek injunctive relief
against its enforcement.25 It accomplished this by holding that the state
sovereignty limits established by the Court’s interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment could be evaded by the expedient of suing a State
officer, like the attorney general, charged with enforcing the law.26 Ex
parte Young and similar cases were subject to severe criticism, perceived
as a conservative federal judiciary intruding on the prerogatives of

hear certain types of antitrust suits where injunctive relief was sought,
and then in 1906 to hear actions to set aside orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Currie, supra note 9, at 2. It appears that the
main reasons for these provisions were the perceived importance of the
actions being heard, and the need for prompt appellate resolution via a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. See Michael T. Morley, Vertical Stare
Decisis and Three-Judge Courts, 108 Geo. L.J. 699, 719–25 (2020) (discussing the 1903 and 1906 laws). However, these laws lack the interesting
provenance and controversy associated with the 1910 statute, and did not
generate the type or amount of litigation as did the latter, so it is no
surprise that they play only minor roles in the story of the three-judge
district court. These statutes were repealed in 1974 and 1975, respectively.
Id. at 740–43.
23.

The history of the three-judge district court recounted in this paragraph
and the next is addressed in greater detail in Owen M. Fiss, Troubled
Beginnings of the Modern State, 1888–1910, at 211–12 (1993);
Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion
Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of
the Constitution 184–85 (2009); Currie, supra note 9, at 3–8; Joseph
C. Hutcheson, Jr., A Case for Three Judges, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 795, 798–
803 (1934); Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate
of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 101, 111–18
(2008) [hereinafter Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young].

24.

209 U.S. 123 (1908). There is a lively scholarly debate on how much Ex
parte Young doctrinally relied on or departed from case law addressing
the then-existing equitable powers of federal courts. For a summary of and
contribution to that debate, see James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel,
The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72 Stan. L. Rev. 1269,
1282–90 (2020). See also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex parte Young and the
Transformation of the Federal Courts, 1890–1917, 40 U. Tol. L. Rev.
931 (2009) (situating Ex parte Young in the context of broader changes
to federal court litigation and political and policy transformations).

25.

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 149–50, 165–66.

26.

Id. at 154–55.
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liberal state legislatures seeking to regulate economic relationships. For
example, Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina memorably stated on
the floor of Congress that when “one little judge stand[s] against the
whole State . . . you find the people of the State rising up in rebellion.”27
Congress considered various measures to overrule or limit Ex parte
Young and similar decisions. They ranged from simply prohibiting
federal courts from hearing such cases,28 to requiring federal judges to
take certain additional steps when considering constitutional challenges
to state statutes.29 Ultimately Congress, led by Senator Overman and
others, settled on the more modest response of requiring special procedures, unlike typical federal court suits, to be followed when litigants
sought Ex parte Young-type relief against state statutes in federal
court.30 The statute passed in 1910 required that in such instances a
three-judge district court should decide the request for an injunction.31
The court consists of the district judge before whom the case was

27.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 115 (quoting 45
Cong Rec. 7256 (1910)). Overman’s reference to a “little” federal judge
might seem like mere rhetorical flourish, id. at 115–16 n.80 (pointing out
that another Senator with apparent sarcasm said that federal judges in
his state or elsewhere were not “little”), but it seems to accurately reflect
then-extant hostility to merely one federal judge striking down a state
statute. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 118 & n.13 (1965)
(referring to an episode in 1907 where the governor of North Carolina
[coincidentally or not, Overman’s state] “publicly urged state officials to
ignore” a federal judge’s decision holding a state statute unconstitutional)
(citing S. Ry. Co. v. McNeill, 155 F. 756, 790–91 (1907)).

28.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 113; Hutcheson,
supra note 23, at 804.

29.

William G. Ross, A Muted Fury: Populists, Progressives, and
Labor Unions Confront the Courts, 1890–1937, at 74 (1994);
Hutcheson, supra note 23, at 804; William F. Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus
W. Peckham and the Case of Ex Parte Young: Lochnerizing Munn v.
Illinois, 1980 BYU L. Rev. 539, 556.

30.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 116–18. This result
was of a piece with the eventual demise during this era of other proposed
drastic prohibitions or limitations on Supreme Court and lower federal
court authority to review state legislation. The adoption of more limited
measures like the three-judge district court was due to several factors,
including that Progressive critics of federal courts could never agree among
themselves on which particular measures to support, and that the Progressives faced formidable opposition from the American Bar Association and
other interest groups, which favored leaving the courts alone. For discussion,
see Friedman, supra note 23, at 184–85; Ross, supra note 29, at 58, 60–
63, 66, 69; Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 117–18.

31.

Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 557. Congress in 1911 codified
the 1910 Act as § 266 of the Judicial Code. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231,
§ 266, 36 Stat. 1087, 1162–63. See generally Morley, supra note 22, at
728–30 (discussing how the 1910 Act was part of the Mann-Elkins Act,
and its codification in the Judicial Code the following year).
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initially filed, and two other judges assigned by the Chief Judge of the
circuit, at least one of whom must be a circuit judge.32 The court’s
decision could be appealed directly to the Supreme Court which, unlike
a case where certiorari applies, the Court ostensibly had to decide on
the merits.33
The rationales for these procedures were several. Supporters argued
that three judges, rather than just one, would give more careful consideration to an important issue like the constitutionality of a state statute.34 They also argued that the State and its citizens were more likely
to accept a decision by three judges.35 Finally, supporters contended
that the direct-appeal mechanism would assure that the case would be
quickly resolved, by the Supreme Court if necessary, in contrast to a
decision by a single judge with lengthy appellate proceedings thereafter
possible.36
The immediate furor concerning Ex parte Young faded. But over
the following seven decades, Congress expanded the coverage of the
types of cases governed by the three-judge district court.37 The most
notable changes were in 1937 and 1965. In the former year, Congress

32.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 113, 115–17.

33.

§ 266, 36 Stat. at 1163; see infra note 110 and accompanying text.

34.

Currie, supra note 9, at 7.

35.

Id. Thus, Sen. Overman argued that “if three judges declare that a state
statute is unconstitutional the people would rest easy under it.” Id. (citing
45 Cong. Rec. 7256 (1910)).

36.

Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights
Litigation, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 79, 84 (1996) [hereinafter Solimine,
Voting Rights Litigation]. See generally Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte
Young, supra note 23, at 114–18 and sources cited there; sources cited
supra note 23. It might seem odd that the statute would provide for prompt
review by the Supreme Court when criticism of Supreme Court decisions
was in part the driving force of the statute. The apparent incongruity can
be explained by the drafters’ concern with the inability or difficulty of the
losing litigant being able to immediately appeal the grant or denial of a
motion for preliminary injunctive relief, as appellate practice stood at the
time. Absent the direct review feature, there could be long delays in the
lower courts before it might reach the Supreme Court. See Currie, supra
note 9, at 8; Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 114.

37.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 123–24, 131–32,
134. For overviews of various amendments to the three-judge district
court statutes, from 1913 to 1974, see Morley, supra note 22, at 724–43;
Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 123–25, 131–33,
141 n.199. Under the recodification of federal statutes in 1948, the principal
statutes governing which cases would call for a three-judge court were 28
U.S.C. § 2281 (state statutes) and § 2282 (federal statutes), while the direct
review provision was at 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte
Young, supra note 23, at 125 & nn.125–27.
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extended the coverage of the court to include suits challenging the constitutionality of federal statutes.38 This was a vestige of the President
Franklin Roosevelt’s storied, and failed, proposal to “pack” the
Supreme Court, in response to its rulings finding much New Deal
legislation to be unconstitutional. 39 Part of that discussion was criticism
of many federal district judges enjoining the enforcement of New Dealera federal legislation. Critics thought that federal statutes should also
receive the protection, as they saw it, of the three-judge district court.40
In the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress required that certain
(mainly Southern) States with a history of discrimination against, and
disenfranchisement of, African-Americans must preclear certain
changes to election laws with the Department of Justice.41 Part of that
process permitted those States to petition a three-judge district court
convened in the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment to
approve those changes.42 That location was chosen due to the judges in
the District having experience in dealing with other putatively similar,
specialized areas of administrative law, and because it was thought that
judges there would be less hostile to enforcing the Act as compared to
judicial colleagues in the affected states.43
The 1965 expansion of the coverage of three-judge district courts
ironically came at a time when increasing criticism of the court in the
38.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 124; Morley, supra
note 22, at 734.

39.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 124.

40.

Barry Cushman, The Judicial Reforms of 1937, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
995, 998 (2020); Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at
124–25. For further discussion of the 1937 statute, see generally Cushman,
supra; Comment, The Three-Judge Federal Court in Constitutional Litigation: A Procedural Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 555, 561–63
(1960) [hereinafter Chicago Comment].

41.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 132.

42.

Id.

43.

Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking District of Columbia Venue in Voting
Rights Preclearance Actions, 103 Geo. L.J. Online 29, 31–32, 36 (2014).
Aside from federal judges in the District of Columbia not being in the
mostly southern states targeted by the preclearance provision, those judges
were not subject to the courtesy typically afforded Senators during the
appointment process for judges who serve in a State. Id. at 31. For further
discussion of this aspect of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), see id. at 31–
33. Despite contemporary decisions narrowly construing the relevant
statutes, see infra note 50, the Supreme Court expansively interpreted the
coverage of the three-judge district court in the preclearance provision,
given what it called the “extraordinary effect” Congress intended by preclearance, and given that the “clash between federal and state power and
the potential disruption to state government are apparent.” Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 562–63 (1969) (Warren, C.J.); see also id.
at 582 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing
with majority on the coverage issue).
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legal community was already well underway. A confluence of reasons
severely undermined the continued existence of the court. First was the
large number of suits in the 1960s, continuing into the 1970s, that
required the convening of three-judge district courts, reaching several
hundred each year during those decades.44 This was accompanied by
the awkward administrative burdens of assembling three federal judges
to hear and decide a trial.45 Similarly, these cases inevitably generated
many direct appeals to the Supreme Court, reaching twenty or more
decided on the merits each Term during the two decades mentioned.46
The Court considered these appeals a burden compared to the rest of
the Court’s docket, which came up on discretionary certiorari jurisdiction. This was despite the fact that, while the direct-appeal statute
seemed to require the Court to decide each case on its merits, the Court
resolved a significant number of such appeals each Term by summary
affirmances or reversals.47 Indeed, in 1974, the Court observed that it
typically summarily disposed of between two-thirds and three-fourths
of such appeals.48
At the same time, many policymakers felt that the original purpose
of the court, to limit single district judges holding state statutes unconstitutional, was either no longer necessary or at best of limited relevance

44.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 126; see infra Table 1.

45.

See infra text accompanying note 235.

46.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 137; see infra
Table 2. See infra Part II(B)(1) for more documentation and discussion
of the increased caseload at the district and Supreme Court level. The
fact that there was a sharp increase in such cases in the late 1960s to the
mid-1970s likely helped the cause of the opponents of the court.

47.

See infra note 110 and accompanying text; Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte
Young, supra note 23, at 127 & n.134; Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps.
Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 99 n.17 (1974). During this time some of the
direct appeals were also from decisions of district judges sitting alone or
from state supreme courts. Those appeals were not affected by the legislation in 1976, but were almost totally abolished by legislation in 1988.
See Fallon et al., supra note 21, at 1090 (discussing the impact of Act
of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119); Supreme Court Case
Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662. By the 1970s
the Court, sometimes confusingly to itself, lower courts, and the bar, held
that even summary affirmances (with no accompanying opinion) were
technically “on the merits,” and thus ostensibly had a precedential effect.
For further discussion, see infra notes 112, 166 and accompanying text.

48.

Gonzalez, 419 U.S. at 99 n.17 (first citing William O. Douglas, The
Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 Cornell L.Q. 401, 410 (1960)
(providing data from the decisions in volumes 350 through 360 of the U.S.
Reports; fifty-two of such appeals were argued and decided by opinion, while
eighty were summarily disposed of); and then citing Note, The Freund Report:
A Statistical Analysis and Critique, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 878, 902–03
(1974) (providing data from the 1972 Term, indicating that 89 of 132 appeals
(67%) from three-judge district court decisions were summarily affirmed)).
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for a small number of cases. The normal appellate process, with review
as of right by a circuit court and discretionary review thereafter by the
Supreme Court, was considered adequate (as in the vast majority of
cases) to superintend the work of district judges hearing constitutional
challenges to federal statutes.49
A formidable array of high-profile persons and institutions in the
legal community came to press these rationales in calling on Congress
to abolish or limit the scope of the court. These included the Supreme
Court, overtly making such arguments in Court opinions or in other
legal writings;50 the American Law Institute, in its influential Study of
the Division Between State and Federal Courts, suggested by Chief
Justice Earl Warren and issued in 1969;51 prominent scholars, such as
49.

Michael E. Solimine, Ex Parte Young: An Interbranch Perspective, 40 U.
Tol. L. Rev. 999, 1005 (2009). For further discussion of the points in
this paragraph, see Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23,
at 134–37, and sources cited there.

50.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 139–40, 139 n.188.
Chief Justice Burger argued for the abolition of the court in published
writings, as did a study issued by the Federal Judicial Center in 1972 that
he had commissioned. Id. at 139. Likewise, the Court as a whole in its
opinions was overtly lukewarm to the institution of the court during the
Warren and Burger eras, both in its statutory interpretation limiting the
coverage of the court, and in lamenting the burden placed on the Court
by mandatory direct appeals. Id. at 140–41; see, e.g., Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1965) (Harlan, J.) (holding that statutory
mandate to convene the court when state statute is constitutionally challenged did not cover Supremacy Clause cases, where the state law was alleged
to conflict with a federal statute, and basing decision in part on concerns
of judicial administration); Gonzalez, 419 U.S. at 98–101 (Stewart, J., for
a unanimous court) (holding that when a three-judge district court denies
an injunction not on the merits but on a ground (here, lack of standing)
that would have justified the court dissolving itself, any appeal should be
to the Court of Appeals, not a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, and
similarly invoking the asserted need of “minimizing the mandatory docket
of this Court in the interests of sound judicial administration”). Both
decisions cited scholarly commentary on the three-judge district court, much
of it calling for the abolition or limitations on the court. Swift & Co., 382
U.S. at 116 n.8, 124 n.20; Gonzalez, 419 U.S. at 96 n.14, 97 n.15, 98 n.16.
But see MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 808 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzalez as an example of the “Court’s hostility to threejudge courts,” though acknowledging that he had joined in that opinion).

51.

Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal
Courts 1, 316–17, 323, 325 (Am. L. Inst. 1969) [hereinafter ALI Study]
(arguing that the court should be abolished for constitutional challenges
to federal statutes, but left intact for such challenges to state statutes and
constitutional provisions, albeit only when the defendant requests that
one be convened). See Sidney B. Jacoby, Recent Proposals and Legislative
Efforts to Limit Three-Judge Court Jurisdiction, 26 Case W. Rsrv. L.
Rev. 32, 32–37 (1975) (discussing proposals of the ALI Study regarding
the three-judge district court). For further discussion of the origins of the
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Charles Alan Wright52 and David Currie;53 and a diverse array of wellknown federal judges from across the political spectrum, such as Henry
Friendly54 and J. Skelly Wright.55 There were defenders of the status
quo, such as the NAACP, arguing that the court was needed to combat
the possible parochialism of federal judges sitting alone, especially in
sensitive civil rights cases.56 But the opposition to the proposed
curtailment failed to gain traction, especially after their arguments were
considered and ultimately rejected by the judiciary committees in
Congress. Especially notable in this regard was the support for change
by the well-known liberal Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee,
Representative Robert Drinan, who argued that civil-rights enforcement by the federal courts would not suffer by abolishing or limiting
the ambit of the court.57
Bills to limit or abolish the three-judge district court were introduced in Congress starting in 1971, and extensive hearings were held
over the next several years.58 The proposals came to a head in 1976.
That year, Congress enacted legislation which abolished the court, save
for suits dealing with the “apportionment” of the districts for members
of Congress, and for state legislatures.59 For our purposes, two aspects
ALI study, its other recommendations, and their reception in Congress,
see Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts,
86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2101, 2120–22 (2019).
52.

Admiralty Jurisdiction, United States as a Party, General Federal
Question Jurisdiction, Three-Judge Courts: Hearing on S.1876 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Jud. Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
92nd Cong. 772–74 (1972) (statement of Professor Charles Alan Wright,
School of Law, University of Texas).

53.

See Currie, supra note 9, at 75–76.

54.

Hearing on S.1876, supra note 52, at 749 (statement of Judge Henry Friendly).

55.

Id. at 791 (statement of Judge Skelly Wright).

56.

See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1379, at 13–14 (statement of Rep. Robert Drinan).
See also MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 808 (1975) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]t least some observers believe the three-judge court to be
an important institution for litigants such as civil rights and welfare plaintiffs. Three judges may well display more sensitivity to national policies
and perspectives than would a single judge, and when three judges decide
in favor of a minority or an unpopular group their decision is likely to inspire
more respect than would the decision of a single judge.”). For a particularly
thorough argument in favor of leaving the court intact, see Wendy G.
Singley, Note, The Abolition of Three-Judge Courts: Too High a Price for
Judicial Efficiency?, 4 Hofstra L. Rev. 355, 381 (1976).

57.

For further discussion of and citation to the authorities mentioned in the
paragraph, see Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at
143–44, 147–48.

58.

Id. at 141–43 (summarizing the hearings in Congress).

59.

Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified in part
at 28 U.S.C. § 2284).

921

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
The Strange Career of the Three-Judge District Court

of the legislation are especially noteworthy. One is the reapportionment
exception, which covered canonical cases like Baker v. Carr60 and its
“one-person-one-vote” progeny, as well as other suits involving statewide apportionment.61 The legislative record is not crystal clear on why
Congress created this exception; the Committee reports on the final
legislation simply refers, in an unelaborated way, to the “importance”
of those types of cases.62 Among the reasons advanced by policymakers
was that it was thought such cases, dealing with court review of the
decennial drawing of district lines (typically by the state legislature,
sometimes in conjunction with the governor and other elected officials),
were particularly controversial63 and subject to possible explicit or
implicit partisan decision-making by federal judges, and hence more
appropriate for decision by three judges.64 Indeed, even some stalwart
critics of the general notion of three-judge district courts had for that

60.

369 U.S. 186, 187–88, 209 (1962) rev’g 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn.
1959) (three-judge court).

61.

See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, 568 (1964) (applying the
one-person one-vote rule to state legislative apportionment).

62.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 144.

63.

For a particularly astute student article making the point, see Note, The
Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Changing Roles in Federal-State Relationships, 72 Yale L.J. 1646, 1660 (1963) [hereinafter Three-Judge Court
Reassessed] (observing that in reapportionment cases, a “federal court is
likely to engage in a prolonged, not always harmonious, dialogue with the
state legislature,” and arguing that a “three-judge court would be appropriate
because of its greater dignity and ability to elicit a compliant response.”).
Even a generation later the Supreme Court has emphasized that redistricting
is “primarily the duty and responsibility of the state” and that “federalcourt review of districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the
most vital of local functions.” Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018)
(quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (internal question
marks and alterations omitted)); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139
S. Ct. 2484, 2496–97, 2507 (2019) (emphasizing that while federal courts
may adjudicate one-person-one-vote and racial gerrymandering challenges
to apportionments, historically federal courts have deferred to the political
process); Thomas v. Reeves, 961 F.3d 800, 808 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
(Costa, J., concurring) (the 1976 Act “retained the procedure for a small set
of important cases: constitutional challenges to redistricting for congressional
and state legislative seats, then-recent phenomena in the aftermath of the
revolutionary one person, one vote line of cases”).

64.

See Joshua A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts,
2011 Utah L. Rev. 433, 442–44, 462–63 (discussing the ideological
concerns of single-judge and three-judge district courts in the context of
election law); Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. Solimine, Precedent, ThreeJudge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy, 107 Geo. L.J. 413,
444, 451 (2019) (describing the important virtues of three-judge district
courts as “impartiality and legitimacy”).
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reason argued for such an exception.65 By the same token, it was also
thought at the time that this exception would be a narrow one, and not
generate the large number of cases that was the bane of the court in
the previous two decades.66
The other notable aspect of the 1976 legislation is, in the end, its
relatively uncontroversial nature and the wide support (or perhaps
better put, limited opposition) it ultimately received. There were Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress at that time, unafraid to
respond to Republican Presidents and, it might be thought, sympathetic to the concerns of defenders of the status quo like the NAACP.67
But as already noted, supporters of eliminating or limiting the court
started with the Justices of the Supreme Court, as revealed in their
decisions, and continued with prominent jurists, scholars, and interest
groups spanning the political spectrum. The reasons for drastically
limiting the jurisdiction of the three-judge district court were framed
almost exclusively in efficiency and administrative concerns. It appears
that this was thought to be a mostly technical, nonpolitical correction,
and Congress was deferring to the presumed expertise of federal judges
and other high-profile policymakers from the legal community.68 The
opponents of the change were far fewer in number and failed in their
effort to turn the debate into a more substantive one.69
65.

See Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 137, 137
n.176–77 (citing to scholarly commentary which uniformly criticized the
court but argued that it is still appropriate in controversial cases like racial
discrimination or reapportionment).

66.

For further discussion of and citation to the points made in this paragraph,
see Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 138, 144–45.
An illuminating contemporary account making many of these points, by
the then-Deputy Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, is Michael
J. Mullen, Improving Judicial Administration by Repealing the Requirements
for Three-Judge District Courts, 20 Cath. Law. 372, 374–76 (1974). Our
account also greatly benefitted from further discussions with Mr. Mullen,
elaborating on the legislative history of the 1976 Act. See E-mail from
Michael J. Mullen, Sr. to Michael E. Solimine, (July 18, 2019 10:01 PM)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Mullen E-mail].

67.

Congress Profiles: 94th Congress, U.S. House of Representatives Off.
of the Historian https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/
Profiles/94th/ [https://perma.cc/8V5X-Q2D3] (last visited Jan. 2, 2022);
Party Division, U.S. Senate https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm
[https://perma.cc/7587-EPA6] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021); see also Solimine,
Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, 147–148 (discussing the Congressional majorities and their opposing views to the NAACP).

68.

See H.R. Rep. No. 104-179, at 9–12 (1995) (discussing that Congress
originally limited the jurisdiction of three judge district courts because
they were a “serious drain upon the federal judicial system” and “administratively complicated to convene and conduct”).

69.

For further discussion of these points, see Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte
Young, supra note 23, at 146–48, 151–53. Chief Justice Burger took an
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While Congress downsized the three-judge district court in 1976 to
the reapportionment exception, its use in the preclearance provision in
the Voting Rights Act was left intact.70 Since then, Congress has
periodically considered proposals to require such courts to be convened
to hear certain types of suits.71 It has required that constitutional
challenges to certain federal statutes be initially brought before such a
court, with the most notable example being the Bipartisan Campaign

especially active role in urging Congress to eliminate or substantially limit
the jurisdiction of the three-judge district court, and to eliminate direct
appeals. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the
Judiciary, 62 A.B.A. J. 443, 443–44 (1976); Warren E. Burger, The
Condition of the Judiciary: Year-End Report, 20 Res Gestae 76, 78
(1976). On the likelihood of Congress adopting the recommendations of
the Chief Justices, as revealed in their Annual Reports, see generally,
Richard L. Vining Jr., Teena Wilhelm & David A. Hughes, The Chief
Justice as Effective Administrative Leader: The Impact of Policy Scope
and Interbranch Relations, 100 Soc. Sci. Q. 1358, 1358 (2019). The 1976
legislation is particularly striking given that Democratic majorities in both
chambers in Congress at the time were not reticent in passing laws that
aided plaintiffs in civil-rights actions. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean
Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 Lewis & Clark
L. Rev. 637, 651–52 (2013) (discussing how Congress during this period
enacted private rights of actions and fee-shifting statutes to facilitate
enforcement of federal law).
70.

The use of the court for preclearance actions became dormant after the
Court held that the separate coverage formula of the preclearance provision
was unconstitutional. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).

71.

See Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 149 (discussing
several examples, including one to require the court be convened to hear
constitutional challenges to the passage of state referenda). Other recent,
unenacted proposals include three-judge district courts to hear any constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act of 2010, see 155 Cong.
Rec. S13791–92 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (submitted by Sen. Orrin
Hatch), to a proposed bill to limit the ability of President Trump to fire
Special Counsel Robert Mueller, see Special Counsel Independence and
Integrity Act, S. 2644, 115th Cong. § 2(e)(2) (2018), or to federal statutes
where a national or universal injunction is sought, see Bradford Mank &
Michael E. Solimine, State Standing and National Injunctions, 94 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1955, 1980–81 (2019); Howard M. Wasserman, Congress
and Universal Injunctions, 2021 Cardozo L. Rev. de•novo 187, 197–
98; Szymon S. Barnes, Note, Can and Should Universal Injunctions Be
Saved?, 72 Vand. L. Rev. 1675, 1709–12 (2019); see also Thomas P.
Schmidt, Judicial Minimalism in the Lower Courts, 108 Va. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3914201 (manuscript at
71–72) (following example of a three-judge district court, arguing that
nationwide injunctions should only go into effect when issued by more than
one judge, given the “general pattern of the judicial system that the more
legally consequential a decision is, the more judges must concur in it.”)
(footnote omitted).
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Reform Act of 2002 (McCain–Feingold).72 Between such cases and the
reapportionment exception, the three-judge district court generates a
relatively small number of cases. But on election law issues, they have
attention and influence disproportionate to their numbers in both
district courts and on direct appeals to the Supreme Court.73 The notion
of three judges being more appropriate to hear certain types of highprofile cases in the first instance continues to have resonance in some
quarters.
B. The Three-Judge District Court in the Civil Rights Era

From the near demise of the three-judge district court, we return
to the era when there were large numbers of cases in those courts, both
at the trial level and on direct appeal to the Supreme Court. That time,
which we and many others label the Civil Rights Era,74 is for us bookended by the advent of the Warren Court (conventionally associated
with the appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice) in 1954 and the
statutory diminution of the three-judge district court in 1976.75 Those
years were marked by much federal-court litigation concerning, among
72.

For further discussion of the use of the court in challenges to the BCRA,
and of other discrete instances where Congress has required the use of a
three-judge district court since the 1976 legislation, see Michael E. Solimine,
The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional Courts, 17 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 115, 128–29 (2014).

73.

Douglas & Solimine, supra note 64, at 419; Richard L. Hasen, Election
Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but
with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1597, 1620–
22 (2016).

74.

See generally Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights:
The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality
(2004) (discussing the history of the Civil Rights Era through the context
of Supreme Court decisions starting in the 1950s and ending in the 1970s).
We concede that our use of the term “Civil Rights Era” for the 1954–1976
period is for convenience and is arbitrary and imprecise. There are of
course no formal beginning and ending dates for the era. Some might trace
the beginning to the 1940s, and its informal end to the early years of the
Nixon Administration, as it in particular concerns legislation and court
decisions dealing with race relations. See, e.g., James T. Patterson, Grand
Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974, at 26, 735 (1996);
Christopher W. Schmidt, Legal History and the Problem of the Long Civil
Rights Movement, 41 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1081, 1081–82 (2016).

75.

Three-judge district court litigation prior to 1954 has been subject to less
systematic study. For some discussions of that period, see Felix Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts,
13 Cornell L.Q. 499, 518 (1928) (discussion of such litigation and the
direct appeals to the Supreme Court from 1913 to 1926); Hutcheson, supra
note 23, at 813–25 (discussion of such litigation from 1910 to 1934); Mila
Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 Harv. L.
Rev. 920, 959–62, 970–73 (2020) (discussing Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), and other Supreme Court cases on direct appeal from
three-judge district courts).
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other things, the development and application of the Bill of Rights, and
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Many of those suits involved challenges to state statutes
and provisions of state constitutions, requiring the convening of threejudge district courts.76
The growth in the caseload at the district court level is documented
in Table 1. As it indicates, for much of the 1950s, about fifty threejudge district courts were convened per year.77 Those numbers rapidly
rose in the early 1960s, reaching 215 by 1969, and rising still further to
a high of 320 in 1973. It steadily declined to 208 cases in 1976, and it
fell sharply thereafter.78 In most years, over one-half of those cases were
civil rights and reapportionment actions.79 The growth in direct appeals
from such courts decided on the merits by the Supreme Court is
documented in Table 2.80 As shown there, the number of cases decided
76.

For further discussion of the reasons for the large numbers of such cases
during the period in question, see infra Part II(B).

77.

As Table 1 indicates, the source of the data is various issues of the Annual
Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts [hereinafter Annual Report]. The Annual Report refers to “hearings,” not simply
filed suits or cases. The terms are not synonymous: a three-judge district
court might be convened and terminated without a hearing as such being
held, and there might be multiple hearings in one case. See Solimine, Voting
Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 90–91. Nonetheless, for convenience
we will use the terms more or less interchangeably hereafter.

78.

As late as 1977 and 1978 there were 112 and 67 cases, respectively, because
the statutory change did not apply retroactively. See Act of Aug. 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-381, §7, 90 Stat. 1119, 1120 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284) (indicating that the “Act shall not apply to any action commenced
on or before the date of enactment [Aug. 12, 1976].”).

79.

See infra Table 1. The numbers are considerable even taking into account
the forty to sixty appeals, on average each year, from orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). Judicial Review of the Interstate Commerce
Commission: Hearing on S. 663 and H.R. 785 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Congress 30 tbl.40 (Dec.
10, 1974). Congress abolished that path to appeal ICC orders in 1975. See
note 22 supra. The distinction between the remaining types of cases (i.e.,
civil rights, reapportionment, and others) was reported in the Annual Report,
starting in 1963. However, the Annual Report did not further define the
categories, and the staff that prepared the tables relied on reports from
clerks of U.S. District Courts. See Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra
note 36, at 91 n.78 (citing correspondence with staff at the Administrative
Office). Presumably District Court clerks defined “civil rights” similar to how
we do, see note 18 supra, as referring primarily to discrimination cases under
the Equal Protection Clause or other laws. But it may have included some
or many “civil liberties” cases, involving the First and other Amendments.
So the numbers in Table 1 should be compared to our data set with caution.

80.

In Table 2, the totals of three-judge district-court cases decided on direct
appeal by the Supreme Court, per Term, is taken from the U.S. Supreme
Court Judicial Database Project. See Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation,
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on the merits (i.e., typically after briefing and oral argument) ranged
from five to twelve during the 1954 through 1960 Terms, but picked up
considerably after that. It ranged from a low of fifteen in the 1965 Term
to highs of fifty-nine and sixty-five in the 1972 and 1976 Terms, respectively. The average from the 1961 through 1976 Terms was approximately thirty-eight, which accounted for nearly 25% of all of the cases
decided on the merits by the Court during these Terms.81
Most of these cases, at the trial level or on direct appeals to the
Supreme Court, involved constitutional challenges to state statutes or
constitutional provisions, and many involved civil-rights or civilliberties issues.82 And here lies the basis of the apparently strange career
of the three-judge district court referenced in the title of this Article.
Recall that Congress originally established the court, in part, as a limit
on federal judicial invalidation of state regulatory legislation during the
Progressive Era. It was thought that three judges were less likely to
issue injunctions invalidating such legislation than merely one. Litigation during the opening years of the Civil Rights Era turned this
narrative on its head. In at least some cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys in
civil-rights cases preferred to litigate before three-judge district courts.
They felt that at least two out of three judges, especially in the Deep

supra note 36, at 106 n.166 (citing Memo from James L. Walker to Michael
E. Solimine (Jan. 17, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform)). That source is now available as the “Supreme Court Database.” The Supreme Court Database, Wash. U.L., www.scdb.wustl.edu
[https://perma.cc/F7YN-HZ5H] (last visited Sept. 10 2021). The totals
used to calculate the percentages in Table 2 of all Court decisions on the
merits, per Term, are taken from Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal,
Harold J. Spaeth & Thomas G. Walker, The Supreme Court
Compendium: Data, Decisions, and Developments 88–89 tbl.2-2 (6th
ed. 2015) (including both signed and per curiam opinions). Another source
of data for such cases on the Supreme Court’s docket are the statistical
compilations in the annual November issues of the Harvard Law Review.
See The Three-Judge Court Reassessed, supra note 63, at 1655 & n.53; Note,
The Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 299, 304 (1963) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. These separate sources of data may not yield identical figures for any given year or Term.
81.

Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 106 n.168, 107, 138.
On the other hand, these numbers do not indicate the number of summary
affirmances or reversals each Term. For discussion of the latter dispositions,
see infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.

82.

Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 126; see also Arthur
D. Hellman, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights: The Plenary Docket In
the 1970’s, 58 Or. L. Rev. 3, 3, 60 n.231 (1979) (documenting increase
in civil rights cases on Supreme Court docket from 1959 through 1976 and
attributing increase in part to appeals from three-judge district courts).
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South, were—all things being equal—more likely to hold for their position than one possibly recalcitrant district judge acting alone.83 And no
matter how the three-judge court held, there would be a direct appeal
to the Supreme Court, which, starting with Chief Justice Warren’s
appointment in 1954 and the holding in the same year in Brown v.
Board of Education,84 was considered a hospitable forum for civil rights
plaintiffs. This process would be, in theory, faster than the usual practice of an appeal to the court of appeals, followed by a possible discretionary writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.85
There is considerable evidence from the chroniclers of the storied
school desegregation litigation, and other civil rights litigation mainly
in southern states, supporting this account.86 This is not to say that all
three-judge district court decisions in such litigation were in favor of
plaintiffs. Consider Brown itself, which reversed a three-judge court
decision.87 But other well-known civil-rights cases illustrate the strategy

83.

See Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 128–29 &
n.140 (citing several examples of Civil Rights Era cases decided before
three judge district courts).

84.

347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

85.

See generally Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 127.

86.

Some of these accounts are more journalistic or anecdotal, see, e.g., Jack
Bass, Unlikely Heroes 19 (1981); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in
the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the
Civil Rights Revolution 69–70 (1994), while others are more
systematic, see, e.g., J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men:
Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation 108–09
(1961); Robert J. Steamer, The Role of Federal District Courts in the
Segregation Controversy, 22 J. Pol. 417, 424–26 (1960); Leanna Lee
Whitman & Michael Hayes, Lou Pollak: The Road to Brown v. Board of
Education and Beyond, 158 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc’y 31, 44–45 (2014).
This is not to say that plaintiffs choose three-judge district courts in lieu
of filing before single district judges. While throughout the history of the
three-judge district court, it was often unclear when such a court needed
to be convened, see Currie, supra note 9, passim, the statute on its face
mandated convening of the court when plaintiffs sought to enjoin a statewide law as unconstitutional. In those circumstances, the court would be
convened whether plaintiffs (or defendants) desired that as a litigation
strategy or not. There were unclear exceptions to this mandate, such as
when the state statute was “clearly” unconstitutional. Id. at 64–65.
Nonetheless, some civil-rights plaintiffs appear to have filed suit in the
first instance largely because they knew a three-judge district court would
be convened. See Greenberg, supra, at 126–27 (discussing plaintiffs’
litigation strategy in Brown); Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra
note 23, at 128 n.137 (discussing the point more generally).

87.

347 U.S. 483 (1954), rev’g 98 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D. Kan. 1951) (threejudge court). See also two of the other three cases jointly decided by the
Supreme Court in Brown, Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 536–37
(E.D.S.C. 1951) (three-judge court), and Davis v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 103 F.
Supp. 337, 340 (E.D. Va. 1952) (three-judge court).
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of litigants favoring such courts.88 And there is anecdotal evidence in
some high-profile cases not involving racial discrimination, both before89
and during (or shortly after) the Civil Rights Era, of three-judge district
courts holding for plaintiffs. Consider, from the constitutional-law and
federal-courts canons, such cases as Roe v. Wade,90 San Antonio School
District v. Rodriquez,91 or Younger v. Harris.92
Do more systematic studies support the model of three-judge
district courts being favorable forums for litigants challenging state
laws? To date, a few such studies provide at least some support for the
proposition. Two studies, covering several hundred published decisions
from 1963 through 1968, compared constitutional litigation before single
district judges and three-judge district courts, and found that the latter
were more likely to find for plaintiffs than the former.93 Another study,
focusing on school desegregation litigation in the wake of Brown, similarly found that three-judge district courts were more likely to hold for

88.

See, for example, litigation involving the famed Montgomery bus boycott,
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 711 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (per curiam)
(three-judge court), aff’d, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). Of particular interest is the
dissenter in the district court in Browder, who criticized the majority for
taking what he saw as an activist position in over-broadly interpreting
Supreme Court decisions to hold for the plaintiffs. Id. at 718 (Lynne, J.,
dissenting). The precise issue that split the court, as recognized by the
majority, was whether Brown expressly overruled the separate-but-equal
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) outside the education
context. Browder, 142 F. Supp. at 717. For examples of other three-judge
district courts holding for plaintiffs in desegregation cases in the 1950s and
1960s, see Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 127–29.

89.

See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 528–31, 536 (1925) (enjoining state law mandating public schooling), aff’g 296 F. 928, 931 (D. Or.
1924) (three-judge court); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 625–26, 628–29, 642 (1943) (enjoining state law requiring students to
salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance), aff’g 47 F. Supp. 251,
252 (S.D.W. Va. 1942) (three-judge court).

90.

410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (holding unconstitutional laws forbidding abortion),
aff’g 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1217, 1219 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (three-judge court).

91.

411 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1973) (upholding use of property tax to finance public
schools), rev’g 337 F. Supp. 280, 280–81 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam)
(three-judge court).

92.

401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (requiring federal courts to abstain when state criminal
defendant could raise federal constitutional claims in state prosecution),
rev’g 281 F. Supp. 507, 507–08 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (three-judge court).

93.

Eleanor C. Main & Thomas G. Walker, Choice Shifts and Extreme Behavior:
Judicial Review in the Federal Courts, 91 J. Soc. Psych. 215, 218, 220
(1973) (in 521 cases, individual judges held 45% of statutes unlawful, and
three-judge district courts held 67% of statutes unlawful); Thomas G. Walker
& Eleanor C. Main, Choice Shifts in Political Decisionmaking: Federal
Judges and Civil Liberties Cases, 3 J. Applied Soc. Psych. 39, 42–43 (1973)
(in 1995 cases, comparable percentages were 30% and 65%, respectively).
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plaintiffs than single judges.94 A third study focused on decisions of
three-judge district courts in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits from 1963
through 1975 and found marked plaintiff success at the trial level and
when those cases were appealed to the Supreme Court.95
All of these studies remain interesting and valuable for purposes of
this Article, but they have limitations as well. They variously do not
cover all of the years of the Civil Rights Era (however one defines that
term); do not cover all types of cases, by subject-matter, that were
litigated before three-judge district courts in the relevant time period;
or are limited to certain regions of the country. To obtain a more comprehensive perspective on three-judge district court litigation, at both
the district and Supreme Court levels, a broader search for and coding
of decisions was necessary. The next section of the Article undertakes
that task.

II. Empirical Study of Three-Judge District Court
Decisions in Civil Rights Cases, 1954–1976
This Part of the Article presents our empirical study of three-judge
district court decisions, in cases challenging state practices, during the
Civil Rights era and its immediate aftermath, until Congress considerably restricted the jurisdiction of the court. We first summarize our
data collection and coding strategies, and then summarize the results.
A.

Data Collection, Case Coding, and Hypotheses

In the prior Part we addressed the history of the three-judge district
court through statutes passed by Congress, their application and
interpretation by federal courts, and by reviewing how some litigants
pursued certain types of litigation through those courts. In this Part,
we focus mainly on decisions of those courts. Our starting point is the
data found in Tables 1 and 2, which provide the landscape of the large
number of such cases in U.S. District Courts and on direct appeal to
the Supreme Court. But that data tells us little about individual cases.
There is empirical literature on decision-making by federal district
judges, and by the Supreme Court, but as far as we know, relatively
94.

David W. Romero & Francine Sanders Romero, Precedent, Parity, and
Racial Discrimination: A Federal/State Comparison of the Impact of
Brown v. Board of Education, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 809, 821 (2003).

95.

Calvin Montgomery Miller, The Impact of the Abolition of Three-Judge
District Courts on Minority Litigants’ Access to the Federal Courts 1
(1977) (Ph.D. dissertation, Lehigh University) (on file with the author).
Among other things, Miller found that in 320 decisions, plaintiffs prevailed
in 45% at the trial level and in 77% of those appealed to the Supreme Court.
Id. at 103. These figures compared favorably to other studies of single
district judges in race relation cases in the South at about the same time.
Id. at 103–04. All of these studies are further summarized and discussed
in Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 129–31.
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little of it focuses on three-judge district court decisions or direct
appeals from those cases.96
To fill this gap, we created our own dataset of those cases. As we
have already stated, our focus was on decisions in district courts and
direct appeals of those decisions to the Supreme Court from 1954 to
1976. The years are respectively based on the advent of the Civil Rights
era, insofar as it reflected in decisions by federal courts, and when
Congress considerably restricted the jurisdiction of the court. While
during that same time frame some constitutional challenges to federal
statutes had to be adjudicated before a three-judge district court, our
focus for this study is challenges to state laws. As far as we are aware,
there is no available list of or database focusing on three-judge district
court decisions concerning such challenges. To create such a database,
we conducted searches on Westlaw of officially published opinions97 of
such courts, in constitutional challenges to state laws, handed down
between January 1, 1954, and December 1, 1976.98 The searches yielded
885 decisions.
96.

On district court decisions, see, e.g., C.K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp,
Politics & Judgement in Federal District Courts 18 (1996), which
analyzes and reports data on over 40,000 decisions, published in the Federal
Supplement, by individual district judges over a 40-year period. There is a
huge literature on Supreme Court decisions, much of it based on The Supreme
Court Database, supra note 80, but to our knowledge it makes only passing reference, if at all, to direct appeals from three-judge district courts.

97.

By this we mean decisions published in the Federal Supplement (F. Supp.)
or Federal Rules Decisions (F.R.D.). For the time period in question, and
before and after, there are relevant decisions that are not published in
those places, but nonetheless available on Westlaw or in other ways. But
we are confident that most three-judge district court decisions, involving
the non-trivial issue of a constitutional challenge to a state law, would be
more likely to be published, especially (though not only) if the decision
was directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Limiting the database to
officially published decisions should capture a very large fraction of cases
that we seek to study. For further discussion of the official publication of
decisions of district courts, see Rowland & Carp, supra note 96, at 18–
21; Christina L. Boyd, Pauline T. Kim & Margo Schlanger, Mapping the
Iceberg: The Impact of Data Sources on the Study of District Courts, 17
J. Empirical Legal Stud. 466, 467–69 (2020); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between
the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 Duke L.J. 1, 25–
26, 34–35 (2018); Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 114
n.204. Likewise, our database is limited to those Supreme Court decisions
that were the result of direct appeals of officially published three-judge
district court decisions. We anticipate that relatively few non-officially
published three-judge district court decisions will be subject to full explanatory decisions upon direct review. See id.

98.

Congress acted in August of 1976, see supra note 59 and accompanying
text, but the legislation did not apply retroactively, see supra note 78 and
accompanying text, so three-judge district court cases being litigated at
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With the aid of research assistants, we coded each decision on a
number of variables to test, among other things, what for convenience
we label the Strange Career hypothesis.99 The variables included:
• the location (i.e., which U.S District Court and in what Circuit)
of the court that issued the decision;
• the composition of the panel (two district judges and one circuit
judge, or vice-versa);
• whether there was a concurring or dissenting opinion; the
nature of the lead plaintiffs (i.e., an individual, interest group,
a business, or something else);
• the subject matter of the case, broadly described;
• whether plaintiff prevailed, by obtaining an injunction or other
relief against the state law (or whether the case was resolved
on other grounds, without a ruling on the request for an injunction);
• no matter the ruling, whether there was a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court and, if so, what was the result of that appeal
(i.e., whether there was a summary affirmance or reversal, or a
decision with an explanatory opinion after briefing and
(typically) oral argument).
In addition, several of the variables allow us to test, or at least shed
light on, several hypotheses, which can be considered sub-issues of the
general Strange Career hypothesis. One is whether such courts indeed
were on the whole relatively plaintiff-friendly during some or all of the
Civil Rights Era. This might be measured in different ways, but the
primary variable we consider is whether or not the court granted, in
whole or in part, the injunctive or other relief sought by the plaintiff.
The statute, in all its variations, only requires the convening of the
specialized court when an injunction is sought against the state law.100
the time continued to be so. Some of the cases were only resolved in 1977
and 1978, but we concluded that closing the database on Dec.1, 1976 best
captured the era that interests us. The searches and other aspects of the
creation of the database, and the coding of decisions, are described in greater
detail in the Methodological Appendix.
99.

In determining which variables to code, we found particularly helpful the
work of C.K. Rowland and Robert Carp in their analogous coding of
decisions by individual district judges dealing with civil-rights and liberties
issues. See Rowland & Carp, supra note 96, at 22–23. For further
discussion of, and best practices for, the coding of court decisions, see
generally Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis
of Judicial Opinions, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 63 (2008).

100. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1970). Section 2281 was repealed by Act of Aug.
12, 1976, Pub. L. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119. The Supreme Court, and
lower courts, have not been clear on whether the seeking of a declaratory
judgment alone will require the convening of the court. A declaratory
judgment is not mentioned in the statute, but some decisions held that
the statute is triggered if the granting of such relief would be tantamount
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That (near) binary choice does not have the complications of classifying
other types of relief, such as different types or amounts of damages.101
Another hypothesis is premised on the assumption that the threejudge district court was often said to be especially important, and
plaintiff-friendly, in civil-rights litigation in the South (however one
defines that region). So we can examine the number and results of decisions from that region, as compared to other parts of the country. Corollaries of that assumption could be that a disproportionately greater
number of such cases were brought in the South, and similarly that
there were more direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the South.
At least during the time in question, the Supreme Court appeared to
have spent considerable time deciding cases from that region involving
civil rights and liberties.102
There has been some suggestion that three-judge district court decisions are appealed at a higher rate, via direct appeals to the Supreme
Court, than appeals from other district court decisions to the Courts of
to the granting of injunctive relief or if the issues regarding the two types
of relief were the same, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 123 (1973), and
the Court never definitively resolved the issue. Currie, supra note 9, at
13–20 (discussing the cases up to 1964). Sometimes plaintiffs requested
both an injunction and a declaratory judgment, and sometimes a court
would deny or not rule upon the former while granting the latter, on the
basis that the former was unnecessary since the court expected the state
to conform to the holding. See, e.g., Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, 71–
72 (N.D. Ind. 1969) (three-judge court); Melton v. City of Atlanta, 324
F. Supp. 315, 320 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (per curiam) (three-judge court); Roe
v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1970). In other cases the
court would decline to issue an injunction but grant a declaratory
judgment in order to let the legislature act. See, e.g., Yancey v. Faubus,
238 F. Supp. 290, 300–01 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (three-judge court); Garza v.
Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131, 139–40 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (three-judge court).
See generally Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory
Judgment, 63 Duke L.J. 1091 (2014) (discussing the similarities and
differences between the two types of relief). For coding purposes we
treated a grant of a declaratory judgment as the equivalent of the grant
of an injunction.
101. The breadth of our coverage of cases, and our coding, permits us to examine
district-court cases, and those decided on direct appeal by the Supreme
Court, where the state laws were either upheld or declared unconstitutional. Cf. Matthew E.K. Hall & Ryan C. Black, Keeping the Outliers
in Line? Judicial Review of State Laws by the U.S. Supreme Court, 94
Soc. Sci. Q. 395, 399–400 (2013) (study of all state laws passed between
1960 and 2004, and the instances they were invalidated by the Supreme
Court; did not study cases where laws were upheld); Lindquist & Corley,
supra note 2, at 157–60 (examining Supreme Court decisions during
Burger and Rehnquist Courts to uphold or invalidate state laws, but with
no direct mention or analysis of appeals from three-judge district courts).
102. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics
489–92 (2000); Karen O’Connor, The Supreme Court and the South, 63
J. Pol. 701, 703 (2001).
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Appeals. Some sources suggest that the rate of appeal of the former
was, in various years, often up to about 40%, which is about double the
rate of appeal for cases before single district judges.103 One of the reasons
for the establishment of the three-judge court was that the legal
community, and presumably the larger public, would give a decision by
three judges, rather than just one, greater respect and acceptance. If
true, one might expect that deference to be reflected by a lower rate of
appeal to the Supreme Court.104 In possible contrast, one might expect
state government officials, because of greater resources and political
pressures, to appeal plaintiff victories in these cases at a higher rate
than other plaintiffs who lose before individual judges. That is, state
governments might be under political pressure to take all steps to
defend state laws, especially when the Supreme Court must hear the
appeal, as compared to the uncertainty of certiorari petitions.105
Coding the rate of direct appeal to, and the disposition of those
appeals by, the Supreme Court, unpacks further aspects of the unique
relationship between three-judge district courts and the Court. The vast
majority of civil and criminal cases in the federal courts are governed
by the same, familiar institutional arrangements. A case will be resolved
at the trial level, with one judge in charge, and the losing party will
have the option of pursuing one appeal as of right to the appropriate
circuit court of appeals. The losing party there may request a discretionary review by the Supreme Court via a writ of certiorari. Relatedly,
differences between trial and appellate judges are widely acknowledged.
District judges work alone and decide a wide variety of disputes and
motions, sometimes of necessity rapidly, mostly relating to the
application of more-or-less well-settled law to factual disputes, and then
preside over trials if the case is not settled or resolved by a pretrial
motion. In contrast, circuit judges collaboratively decide appeals on
three-judge panels and review trial court dispositions—usually with few
time constraints—with a preset factual record, under de novo review
for legal issues, and various standards of deferential review for factual
determinations.106

103. See Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 99 (discussing
sources).
104. Id.
105. See generally Christina L. Boyd, Litigant Status and Trial Court Appeal
Mobilization, 37 Law & Pol’y 294 (2015) (study of appeals in federal
district-court civil cases between 2000 and 2004, exploring motivations of
different types of appellants).
106. For a useful comparison of the work of district and appellate judges, with
citations to the ample literature discussing those differences, see Pauline
T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How
Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. &
Pol’y 83, 86–94 (2009).
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Contrast these familiar patterns with the convening of and decisionmaking by three-judge district courts. These courts are often described
as an awkward fit for the judges and litigants involved, and it is not
hard to see why. Judges who normally serve on different levels must sit
together at the trial level and engage in joint decisions to decide legal
issues and create a factual record. Indeed, the circuit judges would
normally sit in review of their district-judge temporary co-panelists.
This amalgam of different skillsets and relationships might result in
creativity and more thoughtful decisions. On the other hand, it might
result in some frustration with the judging process, such as arguably
undue deference by the district judges to the circuit judge. For example,
some studies have shown that the circuit judge will author a disproportionate number of opinions issued by three-judge district courts,
perhaps demonstrating deference by the district judges on the panel.107
Lawyers used to litigating the vast majority of civil and criminal cases
before one judge might find it odd to litigate a case before a tribunal
that has elements of both a trial and appellate court.108
The awkward fit continues when considering the relationship of the
three-judge district court with the Supreme Court. Normally, district
judges know their decisions can be subject to at least one appeal as of
right by a three-judge panel on the circuit. Appeals judges know their
decisions can be subject to en banc review by the entire circuit, or by
the Supreme Court through a writ of certiorari. In each instance,
though, the judges also know that the overturning of their solo or
collective decisions will be rare: most cases aren’t appealed at all; those
that are appealed are affirmed at a high rate; en banc review is rare;
and the vast majority of writs of certiorari are denied.109
107. For discussion of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Maxwell Mak &
Andrew H. Sidman, Separate Opinion Writing Under Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction: Three-Judge District Panels and the Voting Rights Act,
17 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 116, 124 (2020); Solimine, Voting Rights
Litigation, supra note 36, at 116–18; Thomas G. Walker, Behavioral
Tendencies in the Three-Judge District Court, 17 Midwest J. Pol. Sci.
407, 408–11 (1973). That said, there is a long-standing practice of district
judges sitting by designation on the courts of appeals. See Stephen L.
Wasby, Borrowed Judges: Visitors in the U.S. Court of Appeals
1–2, 7–9, 229–30 (2018).
108. One lawyer during the period we examined referred “to the tendency on
the part of three-judge federal courts to browbeat you into a stipulated
record or cross motions for summary judgment, because they do not have
the time to spend on the case before them.” Alfred L. Scanlan, The Trial
and Appeal of Constitutional Issues, 20 Cath. Law. 386, 389–90 (1974).
109. Most circuit judges, studies show, typically do not act strategically to the
possible threat of reversal by the Supreme Court, in part given the low
possibility of grants of certiorari. See Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie
A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Judging on a Collegial Court:
Influences on Federal Appellate Decision Making 35–36, 114–15
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Now contrast that with the Court’s process of disposing of direct
appeals from three-judge district courts, which is subject to its own
complications. The governing statutes arguably require the Court to
hear and decide all direct appeals, in the sense of giving some reasoned
opinion explaining the result.110 But the Court has never done this, and
instead has almost always treated the request for direct review as the
near functional equivalent of a petition for a writ of certiorari. It
accomplishes this by reserving the right to summarily affirm or reverse
the appeal; if that step is not taken, then “probable jurisdiction is
noted,” and the appeal is typically set for full briefing and oral
argument, with an explanatory decision to follow.111 True, this is not
identical to the certiorari process, for unlike a denial of certiorari, the
Court has held that summary dispositions are technically “on the
merits” for purposes of precedent.112 But the two types of appellate
review have come to be similar.
How this affects judges sitting on three-judge district courts is unclear, regarding the possibility of review of their decisions on that court.
Given the similarities just described, the effects (if any) are probably
similar to the certiorari regime.113 And we are aware of only fairly
episodic empirical studies of the rate of direct appeals and their disposition by the Court.114 We could thus expect these narrow studies to be
reflected in a broader compilation of data of our study.

(2006); Jennifer Barnes Bowie & Donald R. Songer, Assessing the Applicability of Strategic Theory to Explain Decision Making on the Courts of
Appeals, 62 Pol. Rsch. Q. 393, 394–96 (2009). This is not to say that
these lower court judges act as if review of their decisions doesn’t exist.
Judges will typically take into account, explicitly or implicitly, the likelihood
of reversal by a higher court, and while precise measurement is impossible,
it appears higher court precedent is largely followed by lower courts even
with low possibility on average of review and reversals. See David E. Klein
& Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court
Compliance, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 579, 582–84 (2003); Kirk A. Randazzo,
Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District
Courts, 36 Am. Pol. Rsch. 669, 685 (2008).
110. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 64, at 424–25.
111. H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the
United States Supreme Court 31, 105 (1991); Stephen M. Shapiro,
Kenneth S. Geller, Timothy S. Bishop, Edward A. Hartnett &
Dan Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice § 5.16, at 5-55 to 5-56,
§ 5.19, at 5-59, § 5.21, at 5-61 (11th ed. 2019); Douglas & Solimine, supra
note 64, at 419, 424.
112. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 64, at 423–24.
113. Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 108–09.
114. See supra notes 50, 103 and accompanying text. Cf. Mak & Sidman, supra
note 107 (study of three-judge district decisions in VRA cases from 1965
to 2016, examining effect of availability of direct appeals on judicial
decision-making, though not examining any direct appeals themselves).
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1.

Results of Study

Overall Number and Types of Cases

Table 1 provides information on the number and subject matter of
all three-judge district cases during the 1954–1976 time period. Table 3
provides parallel information on a somewhat smaller data set, focusing
on constitutional challenges to state laws.115 While we have discussed
the racial desegregation cases from the 1950s in this Article, what is
especially notable in both of those tables is the large increase in threejudge court cases after the 1950s. In particular, there were several scores
of decisions each year from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s.
What accounted for this noticeable increase in decisions? Part of
the answer is likely the straightforward reason that there were increasingly more cases overall in federal court, more federal judges, and more
lawyers. The number of cases and judges in federal district courts rose
by about 50% over the time period in question.116 Likewise, civil-rights
litigation continued to rise in this period.117 A consequence of this
increased litigation was no doubt an increase in the types of actions
that required the convening of three-judge district courts, and a related
increase in direct appeals of those cases to the Supreme Court.118
The increase in three-judge-court cases in the 1960s and 1970s was
surely also influenced by the number and types of lawyers and lawyering
during this period.119 We have already observed that much of the
desegregation litigation in the 1950s was brought by the NAACP. That
organization (and its related but separate group, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund) continued to litigate race-related and other civil rights
115. In this Table and the remaining ones, we present counts and frequencies,
but do not engage in multivariate or other statistical analysis. Our quantitative descriptive analysis is particularly appropriate given that we are
using a complete data set, not a sample of a larger set. See Hall & Wright,
supra note 99, at 117–18. We leave further statistical analysis for another day.
116. David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of
Federal District Court Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 65, 69–71 tbl.1 (1981) (district court judges increased from 238 in
1954 to 375 in 1976); id. at 86–88 tbl.2 (cases terminated rose from 100,517
in 1954 to 153,850 in 1976).
117. Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and
Private Lawsuits in the U.S. 5 (2010) (discussing “steep rise in private
enforcement litigation” in the federal courts in the late 1960s and early
1970s, based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other statutes); Hellman, supra note
82, at 40 n.164; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 270, 284–85 (1989).
118. Hellman, supra note 82, at 60 n.231.
119. In what follows, we acknowledge relying on secondary sources on civilrights litigation in general. Due to resource limitations, we did not code
or otherwise seek information about the lawyers appearing in the decisions
in our database.
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cases in the following decades.120 Other interest groups, notably the
American Civil Liberties Union, also brought many suits challenging
state practices on constitutional grounds in these decades, and they
were joined in that endeavor by an increasingly broad array of public
interest groups, legal aid societies, and law firms.121 Legal practice was
changing too; attorneys were increasingly specializing and working in
law firms, as compared to the solo-practice model that characterized
much of American legal history.122
To be sure, this formidable array of litigators did not necessarily
act in a highly coordinated way. There is no evidence of a specialized
bar that focused on three-judge district court cases as such. As with
other legal work, these organizations and lawyers did not have unlimited time or resources, and a variety of factors led to any given case
being filed, or not.123 And as we pointed out earlier, the relevant statutes, while no models of clarity in text or in application, required that
a three-judge district court be convened when an injunction was sought
against a state law due to its unconstitutionality, whether specifically
sought by plaintiffs’ lawyers or not.124
Another factor, interrelated with lawyer activity, driving the increase in civil-rights cases in general and, concomitantly, three-judge
district court cases in particular, were changes in procedural and substantive law that facilitated the bringing of such cases. Namely, in the
1960s the Supreme Court and lower federal courts made it easier for
120. See generally Peter Charles Hoffer, The Search for Justice:
Lawyers in the Civil Rights Revolution 1950–1975 (2019); Timothy
J. Minchin, Making Best Use of the New Laws: The NAACP and the Fight
for Civil Rights in the South, 1965-1975, 74 J.S. Hist. 669 (2008).
121. Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional
Change, and the Making of the 1960s, at 129–30 (2016); James T.
Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974,
at 640-41 (1996); Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, the Legal Profession &
Access to Justice in the United States: A Brief History, 148 Dædalus
177, 183 (2019); Tobias, supra note 117, at 276, 279–85.
122. Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent
Litigation Revolution, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1975, 1991–92 (2004).
123. For an extensive study of the resources available to and constraints on
civil–rights groups and lawyers in this era, and of the impact on litigation
strategy, see Stephen L. Wasby, Race Relations in an Age of
Complexity 78–82, 194–95, 209–15 (1995).
124. That said, there is some evidence in three-judge court litigation as a whole
of lawyers engaging in some forum- or judge-shopping, as can be true in
ordinary litigation. If there was more than one District Court in a state,
depending on the circumstances of the case, plaintiffs might have some
options in where suit could be brought. (Even states with only one District
can have different cities where different judges sit.) Depending on who
the Chief Judge of the circuit was, plaintiffs might be able to predict that
favorable judges, as they saw it, would be appointed to the three-judge
court. Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 101–02.

938

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
The Strange Career of the Three-Judge District Court

plaintiffs to bring actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; relaxed standing
requirements for plaintiffs; and amendments to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 in 1966 to make it easier for class actions to be certified.125
These and similar changes operated as a feedback loop, encouraging
attorneys to bring new cases, some of which ended up on the Supreme
Court’s docket.126 For example, the Supreme Court initiated the
Reapportionment Revolution in 1962 in Baker v. Carr, itself originating
as a three-judge district-court case.127 That decision led to a stream of
cases challenging legislative districting by States, which required many
three-judge courts to be convened.128
As we have mentioned, portions of Table 1 divide three-judge
district court cases between civil rights, reapportionment, and others.
We sought an even finer-grained analysis in our study. We coded the
decisions on whether they primarily raised claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment (other than race), the free expression clauses of the First
Amendment (speech, press, assembly), race, religion, voting (including
reapportionment), and economic regulation. The results for the entire
period are found in Table 4. Leading the types of case are the Fourteenth Amendment (51%), voting (18%), free expression (14%), race
(7%), and economic regulation (5%). These counts are not particularly
surprising, since we would expect constitutional129 challenges during the
Warren, and the first half of the Burger, Courts to be dominated by
Equal Protection and Due Process cases.130 Also telling is that relatively
125. On § 1983 litigation, see Hugh Davis Graham, Legacies of the 1960s: The
American “Rights Revolution” in an Era of Divided Governance, 10 J.
Pol’y Hist. 267, 271 & n.13 (1998), for a discussion of Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961), which held that conduct challenged in a § 1983 action
did not have to be based on a state statute. On relaxed standing in this
period and its relation to civil-rights litigation, see Seth Davis, The New
Public Standing, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1229, 1253 (2019). On the amendment
to Rule 23 and its effect on public law litigation, see Tobias, supra note
117, at 280; see also Zambrano, supra note 51, at 2121.
126. Hellman, supra note 82, at 56–58. See generally Vanessa Baird, Answering
the Call of the Court: How Justices and Litigants Set the
Supreme Court’s Agenda (2007) (discussing how litigants that monitor
the Court can affect the law by bringing certain cases before the courts).
127. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
128. Michael E. Solimine, The Causes and Consequences of the Reapportionment
Revolution, 1 Election L.J. 579, 582 (2002) (book review).
129. We coded only constitutional issues, even though three-judge district courts
may have also considered and decided pendent claims that state laws also
violated federal statutes. See Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra
note 36, at 96. See also Thomas v. Reeves, 961 F.3d 800, 801–08 (5th Cir.
2020) (en banc) (Costa, J., concurring) (holding that a three-judge court
cannot be convened to hear purely statutory challenges to apportionment).
130. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Polarized Justice? Changing Patterns of DecisionMaking in the Federal Courts, 28 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 309, 365–66

939

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
The Strange Career of the Three-Judge District Court

few cases involved challenges to economic regulations, meaning that the
vast majority of the cases involved what we may label traditional civil
rights and liberties actions, brought by individual plaintiffs.131
2.

National and Regional Trends and Differences: Frequency and
Results of Cases

We have already noted that during the period of review, the
Supreme Court, especially during the Warren Court, was vigilant about
reviewing civil and criminal cases from the South (however one defines
that word in this context), given the history of Jim Crow and race
relations centered in that region.132 This alone would not necessarily
mean we would expect more three-judge district court litigation in that
region. But together with the anecdotal accounts of such litigation in
the South in the 1950s,133 and the considerable activity of the NAACP
and other civil rights groups in the region, it is suggestive of that result.
The suggestion is supported by the data we report in Table 5. It
shows that the largest proportion (26%) of such decisions are from district courts in the Fifth Circuit.134 (For convenience we’ll keep referring
(2019) (reporting data showing decreased attention to economics and
regulation, and increased attention to civil rights and liberties, in districtcourt decisions from 1940 to 2000). For detailed analysis of the types of
cases litigated before three-judge district courts, see Singley, supra note
56, at 373–74, analyzing data reported in Congressional hearings on the
types of cases in fiscal years 1972 and 1973, including abortion, public aid
to religious schools, penal codes, residency requirements, obscenity, voting,
and welfare, among other things; Commentary, Why Three-Judge District
Courts?, 25 Ala. L. Rev. 371, 381–82 (1973), presenting a sample of
eighty-seven cases decided in 1971 which included abortion, welfare, voting,
First Amendment, and prejudgment attachment cases.
131. In data not reported in a table, 81% of the lead plaintiffs were individuals,
10% were businesses, and 5% were interest groups. Data on file with Solimine.
132. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. See also Robert Jerome Glennon,
The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 Tenn. L.
Rev. 869, 875–76 (1994) (discussing vestiges of Jim Crow and discrimination in voting rights and the criminal-justice system in the South in
the post-WWII era); Lindquist & Corley, supra note 2, at 170 (finding that
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were more likely to invalidate statutes
from Southern states as compared to other regions). See generally Amanda
Clare Bryan & Ryan J. Owens, How Supreme Court Justices Supervise
Ideologically Distant States, 45 Am. Pol. Rsch. 435 (2017).
133. See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
134. Here we refer to the old Fifth Circuit, which was much larger than the
present Fifth Circuit, which consists of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
See Arthur D. Hellman, Deciding Who Decides: Understanding the Realities
of Judicial Reform, 15 Law & Soc. Inquiry 343, 345–47 (1990). Congress
in 1980 split off Alabama, Florida and Georgia into a new Eleventh Circuit,
since the growing population and the large number of cases had made
administration of the old circuit unwieldy. See id. Echoing the legislative
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to the circuits, even though we are only focusing on three-judge district
courts convened within each circuit.135) It grows almost another 10% if
we add decisions from the Fourth Circuit, which includes North and
South Carolina and Virginia. The percentages from all of the other regional circuits trail behind. That said, two somewhat surprising results
are the relatively few decisions from the Ninth Circuit (7.7%) and the
relatively many decisions (15%) from the Second Circuit. The former is
likely due to the circuit not resembling, one or two generations ago, the
large, populous circuit of today. For the latter, one might not expect
the relatively liberal states136 of New York and Connecticut to be a focus
of civil rights litigation, and resultant three-judge district-court decisions. But those states have, surprisingly or not, generated such cases
concerning abortion, voting, reapportionment, and welfare.137 No doubt
the historic concentration of the legal community, and the stock of
statutes that could be targeted in litigation in those older states, played
a large role.

debate a few years earlier over the near total demise of the three-judge
district court, some civil-rights groups opposed the change, in part because
they felt the old Fifth Circuit was generally supportive of their interests
and were uncertain of their prospects if the circuit was split. See id. See
generally Deborah J. Barrow & Thomas G. Walker, A Court
Divided: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Politics
of Judicial Reform 194–96, 239–41 (1988).
135. Three-judge district courts had and have a fraught hierarchical relationship with a circuit; they are both within and apart from it. See Douglas
& Solimine, supra note 64, at 447–448. The court literally sits within a
circuit, and the judges sitting on it are appointed from the circuit (though
curiously the statute does not require that the two additional judges (i.e.,
in addition to the district judge to whom the case was originally assigned)
be from the circuit). See id. at 416, 418, 422. But the court’s decision is
only appealable to the Supreme Court, not the circuit. See id. at 416, 422.
This has led to a split in the cases regarding whether the court is bound by
circuit precedent, as compared to only Supreme Court precedent; the
Court has never directly addressed the issue. See id. at 445–54 (discussing
hierarchical issues and concluding that three-judge district courts may
follow circuit precedent but are not required to). But see Morley, supra note
22, at 745–66 (arguing that such courts must follow circuit precedent).
136. See Devin Caughey & Christopher Warshaw, The Dynamics of State Policy
Liberalism, 1936-2014, 60 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 899, 900 (2016) (reporting a
study of legislation passed by states from 1936 to 2014, showing that “the
most conservative states are in the South, whereas California, New York,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey are always among the most liberal”).
137. E.g., Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge
court) (abortion law); Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(three-judge court) (welfare assistance), aff’d sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 282 F. Supp.
70 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge court) (voting restrictions), rev’d, 395
U.S. 621 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 281 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(three-judge court) (reapportionment), rev’d, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
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We can now consider the overall results of the cases, focusing on
whether the court granted the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. The
data, broken down by circuit, is found in Table 5. Over the twentythree years we study, the courts granted injunctions (or other relief), in
whole or in part, in some 51% of the cases. That figure is fairly consistent among most of the circuits. It is at 42% and 52%, respectively, in
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which encompassed most the states that
were the locus of many of the notable civil rights cases in the era under
study. The percentages are fairly stable over time as well, as the breakdown in Table 6 indicates. From 1961 through 1974, which we might
consider the height of the Civil Rights era, courts granted 52% of
injunctions sought.
Overall, then, we can conclude that there is some support for the
Strange Career hypothesis. Originally it was premised on largely anecdotal accounts of well-known civil rights and liberties cases.138 Later
studies expanded it to larger numbers of decisions of three-judge district
court decisions, in the decade or two after the 1950s.139 Our study more
comprehensively studies the entire 1954 through 1976 period, and
largely replicates those earlier studies. Still, we are painting with a
broad brush, and it must be asked for all of these studies, “as compared
to what?” Perhaps many federal district and circuit judges in ordinary
litigation were holding for civil rights plaintiffs at relatively high rates
during some or all of this era, which would dilute the significance of the
data we find for three-judge district courts. Of course, we can never
know for sure; the actual cases litigated before three-judge district
courts cannot be relitigated in the ordinary process to determine if
different outcomes would have resulted.
What we can do is to compare our results to those studies of individual district-judge or appellate-court litigation in civil-rights and
civil-liberties cases at comparable times which are relatively similar to
those litigated before three-judge district courts. Recall that this is what
was done in several earlier studies. Those studies found that, to varying
degrees, three-judge district courts held for plaintiffs at higher rates
than individual district judges.140 To augment those studies, we can
compare our more comprehensive data to that published by Robert
Carp and his associates subsequent to the studies we just mentioned.
They studied over 45,000 decisions officially published (in the Federal
Supplement), by over 1,500 district judges from 1933 through 1987.141
138. See supra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
141. Rowland & Carp, supra note 96, at 17–18. They did not study threejudge district courts. Id. at 18. Carp and other co-authors have published
follow-up studies and most recently have extended the cited study to cover
over 90,000 officially published decisions handed down between 1927 and
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Their data is broken down by subject matter, time, and region that
allows some comparisons to our data. For the 1954–1968 and 1969–77
periods, closely matching the era we study, they report that district
judges in civil-rights and -liberty cases in the South issued “liberal”
decisions (i.e., upholding the asserted right) 42% and 45% of the time,
respectively.142 The comparable figures for other regions are the North
(39%, 53%), East (39%, 51%), and West (41%, 49%).143 Carp and his
associates conclude that district judges in the North during this period
were generally more supportive of civil rights and liberties than their
colleagues in the South.144 So too, comparing his data with ours, we can
conclude that there is some support for the notion that three-judge
district courts were somewhat more supportive of civil rights plaintiffs
than individual district judges. We come to this conclusion with the
modifiers just noted; the differences are not of a quantum nature and,
while modest, are noticeable.145

2008. See Marc A. Sennewald, Kenneth L. Manning & Robert A. Carp,
The Polarization of the Judiciary, 23 Party Pol. 657, 659 (2017). Carp
and his associates, like many other political scientists, have also studied
the ideological influences on federal judicial behavior by using the political
party of the appointing President, or other measures, as a proxy for ideology.
See Rowland & Carp, supra note 96, at 12–13. See also Adam Bonica
& Maya Sen, Estimating Judicial Ideology, 35 J. Econ. Persps. 97, 97–
99 (2021); Ryan Hübert & Ryan Copus, Political Appointments and
Outcomes in Federal District Courts, 84 J. Pol. 908, 910 (2022). We did
not specifically code that measure, and we leave it for another day.
142. Rowland & Carp, supra note 96, at 61.
143. Id. Different studies place varying states in these regional categories. For
example, we typically use the (old) Fifth Circuit as a proxy for the South,
and sometimes fold in the Fourth Circuit as well. In contrast, for the South,
Rowland and Carp use states from the old Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit,
as well as Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee. Id. at 60 & 186
n.9. These differences should be kept in mind but don’t severely undermine
our use of the Rowland and Carp study for comparative purposes.
144. Rowland & Carp, supra note 96, at 65. Cf. Kritzer, supra note 130, at
363–64 (suggesting that conservatism of federal judges in the South in this
period could be overstated).
145. Since a three-judge district court consisted of at least one circuit judge, it
would also be appropriate to examine their voting patterns as well. Studies
have shown that “southern judges [on the Fourth and Fifth Circuits] of
both parties were substantially more conservative than northern judges in
their voting patterns in civil rights cases before 1969.” Donald R. Songer &
Sue Davis, The Impact of Party and Region on Voting Decisions in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986, 69 W. Pol. Q. 317, 320, 330
(1990) (reporting a study based on a sample of circuit decisions from 1955–
58 and 1965–68). These studies tend to support the notion that three-judge
district courts within the southern circuits were on the whole more
supportive of civil-rights plaintiffs than the appeals judges on those circuits.
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3.

Direct Appeals to the Supreme Court: Frequency and Disposition

We have observed that prior episodic evidence suggests both that
there would be a relatively high rate of appeal from three-judge district
court decisions to the Supreme Court, and that the Court would dispose
of a large fraction of these appeals by summary disposition, rather than
by oral argument followed by an explanatory opinion (akin to a grant
of certiorari).146 Our study has largely replicated these results, and adds
further nuances.147
As Table 7 indicates, a direct appeal was filed in 48% of the
decisions we coded, over double the usual rate of appeal from district
court decisions. Table 7 is also broken down by circuit. It shows some
deviations: the rate ranged from a high of 63% in the Second Circuit,
to a low of 35% in the Third Circuit. But most of the circuits are fairly
close to 50%.148 This data tends to support the notion that three-judge
district cases, as envisioned by the 61st Congress, considered important
issues—enough so that the losing litigants were frequently willing to
press the case to the Supreme Court. On the other hand, it seems to
show relatively little final acceptance of the court’s decisions (to the
extent that can be measured by the rate of appeal), or that governmental officials and entities would be more likely to appeal as compared
to the typical plaintiff.
We also considered the effect of the decision-making by the threejudge panel on the rate of appeal. Only relatively modest numbers of

146. See supra notes 48, 102–05 and accompanying text.
147. One nuance is that when three-judge district courts issued a declaratory
judgment rather than an injunction, see supra note 100, a direct appeal did
not generally lie to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. Rather,
an appeal could only be made to a court of appeals, as in any other case.
See, e.g., Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (three-judge
court), remanded, 450 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1971); Wolfe v. Shroering, 388
F. Supp. 631 (W.D.Ky. 1974) (three-judge court), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 541 F.2d 523 (6th. Cir. 1976). The reason was that the direct appeals
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1253, only refers to the lower court granting or denying
an injunction. Nonetheless, we say generally, because the Supreme Court
was not clear on the point. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 122–23
(1973) (permitting direct appeal from three-judge district court which had
only issued a declaratory judgment while “dismiss[ing] the application for
injunctive relief,” in part due to the “specific denial of injunctive relief”).
See generally Shapiro et al., supra note 111, at 2-33 to 2-35 (discussing
application of § 1253 in the 1960s and 1970s). Our data does not count the
appeals to the courts of appeals as a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
148. There was little difference on the rate of appeal depending on whether
injunctive relief was granted, or not (i.e., whether plaintiff or defendant
was appealing). Plaintiffs and defendants appealed in 48 and 47 percent,
respectively. Data on file with Solimine.
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the decisions in our database were not unanimous: 12% had a concurring opinion, while 19% had a dissent.149 While modest, these percentages are still much higher than the historic pattern for the Courts of
Appeals, the overwhelming majority of which have been unanimous.150
Historically, too, the presence of dissent on a three-judge panel in the
court of appeals made it more likely that the losing litigant would file
a petition for en banc review, or a petition for a writ of certiorari, and
that such petitions would be granted if filed.151 Such a dissent could be
conceptualized as a whistle-blowing signal in the judicial hierarchy that
the case is not routine and could be appropriate for, and make it more
likely that, a resource-constrained higher court would review it.152 Our
data supported the hypothesis that a dissent would more likely lead to
a direct appeal.153 Of equal and perhaps greater importance, the regime
of mandatory appeals required the Supreme Court to, ostensibly, reach
the merits of the appeal, so that the attorneys knew that an appeal had
some chance to succeed, whether or not there was a dissent. Compare
this to a typical long-shot petition for certiorari, of which the Supreme
Court has historically granted only a very small percentage.154
149. There were 111 decisions with a concurring opinion and 175 with a dissent.
Data on file with Solimine. Also, only 4% (34) had two circuit judges on
the panel, rather than just one. Id. In 211 of the cases (23% of the total),
there was an unsigned, per curiam opinion. Id. For very similar data from
a similar study, see Mak & Sidman, supra note 107, at 125, reporting a study
of three-judge district-court decisions in VRA cases, from 1965 to 2016
and showing that 71.7% were unanimous, with 11.1% having concurring
opinions and 17.2% having dissenting opinions.
150. For the period we study, see Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the
United States Court of Appeals Revisited, 69 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 491,
493 (1975), showing that the dissent rate among all of the circuits from
1965 through 1971 averaged 5.9%.
151. Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of
the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev.
171, 179–80, 196 (2001).
152. For discussion, see generally Deborah Beim, Alexander V. Hirsch & Jonathan
P. Kastellec, Whistleblowing and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy,
58 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 904 (2014); and Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller,
Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on
the Federal Court of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998).
153. Of the decisions without a dissent, 45% were followed by a direct appeal,
while for the decisions with a dissent, 70% were followed by a direct appeal.
Data on file with Solimine.
154. Cf. Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, The Presence of Lower-Court
Amici as an Aspect of Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 30 Just. Sys. J.
1, 8 (2009) (finding that a sample of lower-court cases denied review by
the Burger Court, including three-judge district court cases summarily
affirmed or dismissed, indicated that litigants “view[ed] the chances for
Supreme Court review more sanguinely than if the case had also been
reviewed by a court of appeals”). See also Epstein et al., supra note 80,
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Table 8 presents data on the dispositions of the appeals by the
Supreme Court. The most notable aspect of the table is that in only
23% of the appeals did the Court issue an explanatory opinion while
affirming or reversing, while in almost 44% the Court summarily
affirmed. The balance of the appeals, almost 33%, were disposed of on
other grounds. This confirms the long-standing assumption that the
Court only resolved less than one-third of these appeals by a full opinion
(typically prefaced by oral argument and briefing). This is much higher
than the historically tiny rate at which the Court granted writs of
certiorari, but it still demonstrates that the Court was policing, in a
certiorari-like manner, the relatively large number of direct appeals.155
Also notable is that, of the appeals resolved by opinion, the affirmances
(11%) were not much less than the reversals (12%). This too is different
from the cases governed by certiorari: there, the Court has routinely
reversed the majority of those cases.156 Finally, the differences between
the circuits found in Table 9 can be largely explained by the smaller
number of appeals from some circuits. Most of the disposition rates by
circuit were similar to the mean, including the relatively large number
of appeals from the Fifth Circuit.

at 72–74 (providing data on the decline of the granting of certiorari petitions
between 1954 and 1976, ranging from 16% to 10%).
155. The large percentages of summary affirmances might also reflect, in part,
the Court’s effort to engage in Bickelian “passive virtues” by avoiding
difficult or controversial issues during the civil rights era. See Alexander
M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 126, 134 (1962) (discussing summary affirmances
as an appropriate way for the Supreme Court to avoid especially controversial issues under some circumstances). See generally Erin F. Delaney,
Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 Duke
L.J. 1, 17–18 (2016). More recently, Chief Justice Roberts has expressed
concerns in oral arguments (though not in subsequent opinions) that the
Court is under an obligation to “decide [direct appeals] on the merits,” as
opposed to the certiorari regime. See Douglas & Solimine, supra note 64,
at 433 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Shapiro v. McManus,
577 U.S. 39 (2015) (No. 14-990) (Chief Justice Roberts’s remarks)). Contrast
this putative obligation with the high rates of summary affirmances of
three-judge district courts in the era we study, or in earlier times, see, e.g.,
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court
at October Term, 1929, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8, 11 (1930), which discusses
the frequent use of summary dispositions during the 1927 and 1928 Terms.
Perhaps summary dispositions can be masked by the Court when it is
issuing full opinions in many other cases at the same time, while that is
more difficult when the Court is, like now, rendering far fewer decisions.
156. Epstein et al., supra note 80, at 244–55 (showing that reversal rate from
1954 through 1976 Terms ranged from 53% to 76%).
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TABLE 1
THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT HEARINGS, 1952–1980*
YEAR

CIVIL
RIGHTS**

REAPPORTIONMENT

ICC
REVIEW

OTHER

TOTAL

1952

72

1953

57

1954

50

1955

53

1956

50

1957

47

1958

47

1959

47

1960

67

1961

58

1962

15

105

1963

19

16

67

27

129

1964

21

18

50

30

119

1965

35

17

60

35

147

1966

40

28

72

22

162

1967

55

10

64

42

171

1968

55

6

51

67

179

1969

81

1

64

69

215

1970

162

8

42

79

291

1971

176

2

41

99

318

1972

166

32

52

60

310

1973

183

7

52

78

320

1974

171

8

51

19

249

1975

192

9

47

19

267

1976

161

5

25

17

208

1977

67

6

2

37

112

1978

54

3

0

10

67

1979

27

3

0

0

30

1980

25

4

1

3

33

Sources: 1956 Ann. Rep. Dir. Admin. Off. U.S. Cts. 131, 133; 1960 Ann. Rep. Dir.
Admin. Off. U.S. Cts. 116–17; 1962 Ann. Rep. Dir. Admin. Off. U.S. Cts. 627–28;
1976 Ann. Rep. Dir. Admin. Off. U.S. Cts. 208–10 tbl.37; 1980 Ann. Rep. Dir.
Admin. Off. U.S. Cts. 301 tbl.54.
*Annual Reports provide only totals prior to 1962.
**After 1976, tables break “Civil Rights” category into “Voting Rights” and various other
categories.
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TABLE 2
ORALLY ARGUED THREE-JUDGE COURT CASES ON
SUPREME COURT DOCKET, 1953–1980 TERMS
Term
#
%

1953
6
5.6

1954
5
4.9

1955
15
12.4

1956
8
5.9

1957
12
7.9

1958
7
5.0

1959
12
9.2

1960
9
6.1

1961
18
14.9

1962
34
23

Term
#
%

1963
31
21.7

1964
22
18.3

1965
15
11.7

1966
29
19.7

1967
26
15.0

1968
36
27.7

1969
36
28.6

1970
41
25.8

1971
41
25.0

1972
59
33.3

Term
#
%

1973
42
24.9

1974
56
34.1

1975
51
29.0

1976
65
36.9

1977
22
13.7

1978
26
16.1

1979
13
8.4

1980
4
2.6

Source: See supra note 80.

TABLE 3
THREE- JUDGE DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
CHALLENGING STATE LAWS
YEARS

PERCENTAGE*

TOTAL

1954-1960

3.7%

33

1961-1967

18.6%

165

1968-1974

64.3%

569

1975-1978

13.3%
_____________
100.00

118
______________
885

*ROUNDED

948

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
The Strange Career of the Three-Judge District Court
TABLE 4
SUBJECT-MATTER OF DECISIONS
SUBJECT-MATTER

NUMBER

%

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

454

51

VOTING

160

18

FREE EXPRESSION

128

14

RACE

58

7

ECONOMY

45

5

RELIGION

18

2

OTHER

22
___________
917

3
__________
100*

TOTAL
*ROUNDED

TABLE 5
THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS, RULINGS ON
REQUESTS FOR INJUNCTIONS, BY CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT

INJUNCTIONS
GRANTED (%)*

1

66%

47

2

44%

133

3

48%

89

4

58%

86

5

52%

232

6

40%

45

7

53%

76

8

53%

51

TOTAL NUMBER

9

54%

68

10

47%

47

DC

45%

11

TOTALS

___________
51%

__________
885

*ROUNDED
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TABLE 6
THREE- JUDGE DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS,
RULINGS ON REQUEST FOR INJUNCTIONS, BY YEARS

YEARS

GRANTED (%)*

1954-1960

45%

33

1961-1967

55%

165

1968-1974

51%

569

1975-1976

50%

118

TOTALS

51%

885

TOTAL NUMBER

*ROUNDED

TABLE 7
RATE OF DIRECT APPEALS FROM THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT
COURT DECISIONS, BY CIRCUIT
CIRCUIT

RATE OF
APPEAL ( %) *

TOTAL NUMBER

1

38%

47

2

63%

133

3

35%

89

4

45%

86

5

47%

232

6

44%

45

7

47%

76

8

43%

51

9

57%

68

10

40%

47

DC

55%

11

TOTALS

___________
48%

__________
885

*ROUNDED
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TABLE 8
DISPOSITION BY SUPREME COURT OF DIRECT APPEALS
FROM THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURTS

DISPOSITION

TOTALS

PERCENTAGE OF
ALL DISPOSITIONS*

SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

187

44%

REVERSED WITH OPINION

47

11%

AFFIRMED WITH OPINION

53

12%

NO JURISDICTION

12

3%

SUMMARY REVERSAL

0

0%

OTHER

126
___________
425

30%
__________
100%

TOTALS

*ROUNDED

III. The Jurisprudential Impact of the Three-Judge
District Court
In this Part, we step back from our empirical study to consider a
separate but related issue: given the large number of three-judge
district-court decisions at both the trial and Supreme Court levels
during the 1954–1976 era, what particular impact, if any, did the court
have on the content of doctrine? The focus of our empirical study was
primarily bottom-up, starting with trial decisions and tracing the fate
of many of them in the Supreme Court. Here, in contrast, our primary
focus is on the development of doctrine by the Supreme Court. We first
address different ways the question of impact can be approached. We
then discuss three case studies of the possible impact on doctrine.
A.

Competing Models of Impact

Addressing the jurisprudential impact of any legal change frequently takes some form of counterfactual reasoning: if and how the
Supreme Court (or any court) would have addressed a legal controversy
in the absence of the change.157 We can’t be sure with certainty; we

157. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal
Explanations, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1517 (2004).
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can’t eliminate the change and run history again. What we can do is
judiciously examine what did happen for explanatory variables.158
Critics of the three-judge district court have long argued that,
among other things, the court had little effect on the development of
doctrine by the Supreme Court. For example, David Currie argued in
the early 1960s that two important Court decisions, Brown and Baker
v. Carr, which came up on direct appeal from three-judge courts,
“would be heard anyway.”159 (A corollary would be that the cases would
likely have been filed before individual federal judges in the absence of
the three-judge district court.) That is, it is difficult to believe that the
high-profile legal issues presented by the school desegregation and reapportionment cases, post-World War II, would not have been brought
by plaintiffs (especially when supported by interest groups like the
NAACP), or would have escaped the Court’s notice, had the cases been
litigated in the usual course, and come up by way of certiorari. Perhaps
the timing or other aspects of the cases would have been different, and
158. A relevant example would be accessing the impact of Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). It is frequently stated by leading authorities that the decision
had a significant impact on the litigation of civil-rights and constitutionallaw cases in the 20th century. But for the decision, what we now regard
as important issues of constitutional law would likely have been litigated
in state court as defenses or shields to state enforcement actions, rather
than as proactive swords seeking injunctions in actions filed in federal
court. In both instances the cases could have eventually reached the
United States Supreme Court, but the timing and perhaps holdings and
content of the decisions might have differed from what actually happened.
See Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 102 (citing to
work by Professors Charles Alan Wright and Owen Fiss, and opinions by
Justices William Brennan and William Rehnquist, among others, making
these points). Another relevant example is accessing the impact of the
statutory reforms, including the 1976 restriction of the jurisdiction of the
three-judge district court, culminating in the 1988 Act which abolished
virtually all direct appeals to the Supreme Court from federal and states
courts. Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court,
1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 403, 408–09. Scholars have differed on the impact of
these changes on the sharp decline of the Supreme Court’s merits decisions
from the 1980s to the present. Cf. id. at 408–12 (arguing that statutory
changes played minor roles in causing the shrunken docket), with Ryan J.
Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1219, 1278–79 (2012) (giving more
weight to the effect of the statutory changes); Kenneth W. Moffett, Forrest
Maltzman, Karen Miranda, & Charles R. Shipan, Strategic Behavior and
Variation in the Supreme Court’s Caseload Over Time, 37 Just. Sys. J.
20, 33 (2016) (same); and Michael Heise, Martin T. Wells, & Dawn M.
Chutkow, Does Docket Size Matter? Revisiting Empirical Accounts of the
Supreme Court’s Incredibly Shrinking Docket, 95 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1567, 1573–74 (2020) (same).
159. Currie, supra note 9, at 74 (footnote omitted). For similar statements, see,
e.g., Fed. Jud. Ctr., Report of the Study Group on the Caseload
of the Supreme Court 4 (1972) [hereinafter Freund Report];
Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 105–06.
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indeed perhaps the Court could have benefitted even in these nowiconic cases from some percolation on the issues by different lower
courts, a process muted by direct appeals. But these cases, it can be
argued, would have come to the Court nonetheless.160 This No or Little
Effect model is primarily concerned with whether the issues presented
in a three-judge district-court case would have reached the Court anyway, by the usual route, but the model inferentially suggests that the
content of the Court’s decision would likely have been the same as well.
Other scholars have argued, in contrast, that the institutional
arrangements of the federal courts in general, and those of Supreme
Court review in particular, can have and has had some effect on the
content of doctrine. Recently, Andrew Coan has argued that the “judicial capacity” of the Supreme Court can have important impacts on
how the Court develops doctrine.161 There are far too many cases for
the Court to even begin to meaningfully review. In response, he argues,
the Court in recent decades has, for the few cases it does agree to
review, frequently emphasized relatively bright-line rules of law and
deference doctrines, as compared to more opened-ended standards
which would require it to engage in time-consuming, fact intensive,
case-by-case adjudication.162 Similarly, Tara Leigh Grove has argued
that the larger number of cases coming up for review, coupled with the
certiorari power granted to the Court in the Judiciary Act of 1925,
meant that “the Court increasingly had to establish broad precedents
for lower courts to apply in the many cases that it lacked the capacity
to review.”163 She continues that this meant that “to provide meaningful
leadership in this new judicial system, the Court had to craft doctrines
that would cabin the discretion of the lower courts.”164
The Little Effect and Judicial Capacity models are not in direct
conflict; the former is primarily concerned about the Court hearing a
case at all, while the latter is primarily concerned about how the Court
decides cases it agrees to hear. And neither Coan nor Grove expressly
address direct review of decisions from three-judge district courts. But
160. Cf. Gonzalez v. Automatic Emps. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 99 & n.17 (1974)
(stating that many three-judge district court decisions that are summarily
affirmed “would benefit from the normal appellate review.”).
161. Andrew Coan, Rationing the Constitution: How Judicial Capacity
Shapes Supreme Court Decision-Making 5 (2019).
162. Id. at 3.
163. Tara Leigh Grove, Tiers of Scrutiny in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 14 Geo.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 475, 483 (2016) (discussing the Judiciary Act of 1925,
Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936).
164. Id. at 484 (footnote omitted). Both Coan and Grove acknowledge prior
scholarship which made similar arguments, but both seek to more explicitly
link the constraints on the Court’s review with the content of doctrine
developed by the Court. See Coan, supra note 161, at 491; see also Grove,
supra note 163, at 477 n.6.

953

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 4·2022
The Strange Career of the Three-Judge District Court

comparing and contrasting both models can shed light on the structural
and doctrinal impact, if any, on the institution of the three-judge
district court with direct review (or its absence). The Court itself during
much of the Warren Court unapologetically expressed concern about
the burdens of deciding such cases on direct review.165 True, it dealt
with the burden, in part, by freely using summary dispositions, mainly
affirmances. But even that was attended with considerable awkwardness, since the Court insisted that such dispositions were technically
“on the merits.”166
Even with that safety valve, the Court decided considerable numbers of direct appeals with oral arguments and explanatory opinions, as
with cases where certiorari was granted. Critics of the three-judge
district court in the 1950s and 1960s argued that direct appeals required
the Court to spend disproportionate time on unimportant cases and,
inferentially, less time on important ones.167 The analyses of Coan and
Grove suggest that the Court’s development of doctrine in those cases
may have been influenced, at least in part, by the burden of responding
to the direct appeals. That is, at least by implication, the effects of this
burden might have been concentrated in the then-frequent direct
appeals to the Court. This Judicial Capacity model, then, conflicts to
some degree with the model of direct appeals ultimately having little
impact on doctrine.
B.

Case Studies of Jurisprudential Impact

Deciding which model (if either one) might best explain the doctrine
developed by the Court in direct appeals, during the time period of our
study, is no straightforward task. There are no precise metrics for this
qualitative study, and of course we cannot say with certitude these
cases would, absent direct review, have been decided by the Court in
the era we study. We present three case studies involving a variety of
substantive and procedural issues that legal scholars of various specialties have deemed important.168 To preview our conclusions, we find that
for two of three case studies, we can conclude with some confidence
that the direct review mechanism had at least some impact on the
Court deciding the cases at all, at the time it did, and on the develop-

165. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
166. Hellman, supra note 82, at 25–26, 26 n.99.
167. Freund Report, supra note 159, at 4-5; Currie, supra note 9, at 74–75,
75 & n.367; Chicago Comment, supra note 40, at 564–65.
168. For further discussion of the qualitative analysis of doctrine and the use of
case studies, see Coan, supra note 161, at 211–14.
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ment of doctrine. We do not claim that such a relatively modest assertion can be extended to all of the subject-matter areas in our study.
But there was some impact in some areas nonetheless.169
1.

Reapportionment

Table 1 provides data on the number of reapportionment cases in
the district courts in the era we study. As we already observed,170 the
burgeoning number of cases in the early and mid-1960s is attributable
to the impact of Baker v. Carr,171 which held that suits challenging
malapportioned federal and state legislative districts were justiciable in
federal court. Within two years the Supreme Court decided several
cases which upheld such challenges on one-person-one-vote grounds,
and required that legislative districts in many states be redrawn.172 The
Court continued to address that issue in the later 1960s, and in fewer
cases in the 1970s, as the application of the one-person-one-vote
standard became more settled.173
It is difficult to disentangle the institution of the three-judge district
court from the history of reapportionment litigation in the federal
courts. For that entire history, up to the present day, those cases continued to be heard before such courts, and on direct appeal by the
Supreme Court. The Court was deciding such cases, in legal substance
virtually identical to Baker v. Carr, as far back as the early 1930s.174 In
Colegrove v. Green the Court famously held that such suits were nonjusticiable political questions.175 During the 1950s, the Court summarily
affirmed, on the basis of Colegrove and other cases, several further such
169. A fuller examination of other categories of cases and issues in our database
is beyond the scope of this Article. Studies of how the Supreme Court builds
subject-matter agendas in different eras emphasize the importance of the
Court’s discretionary authority to select cases to decide. See Richard L.
Pacelle, Jr., The Transformation of the Supreme Court’s Agenda:
From the New Deal to the Reagan Administration 5–10 (1991); Jack
M. Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint:
Judicial Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 Tex. L. Rev.
215, 216 & n.8 (2019). One leading study found little to differentiate cases
that came up by certiorari or appeals, because as the author saw it, the
Court could make “liberal use of a number of tools designed to deny writs
of appeals or treat them in a perfunctory manner.” Pacelle, supra, at 6.
170. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
171. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
172. Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder Jr., The End of
Inequality: One Person, One Vote and the Transformation of
American Politics 178 (2008).
173. Hellman, supra note 82, at 21.
174. E.g., Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932), rev’g 1 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Miss.
1932) (three-judge court).
175. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), aff’g 64 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill.) (per curiam)
(three-judge court).
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challenges brought before three-judge district courts.176 Baker distinguished Colegrove and the subsequent summary affirmances on the
basis that they did not squarely address the Equal Protection claim
brought in Baker.177
Arguably, the three-judge district-court process substantially
affected the Court’s approach to this issue in the 1960s.178 The relative
rapidity of Court decisions on reapportionment after Baker is certainly
attributable, in part, to the availability of direct appeals to litigation
already pending when, or initiated shortly after, Baker was decided.179
Plaintiffs, as in Baker itself, had not prevailed in many of the cases, but
they were able to promptly secure Court review by direct appeals.180
After the Court handed down several decisions further explicating the
one-person-one-vote standard in 1963 and 1964, it proceeded to summarily dispose of numerous direct appeals from different states.181
The relatively painless Reapportionment Revolution, in its first
decade, was also driven in part by the fact that the one-person-one-vote
standard was “relatively easy to administer as a matter of math.”182
That wasn’t true with apportionment challenges on other grounds that
the Court confronted in later decades, such as those under the Voting

176. As recounted in Baker, 369 U.S. at 202–03.
177. Id. at 209, 230–37.
178. Michael E. Solimine, Congress, the Solicitor General, and the Path of
Reapportionment Litigation, 62 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1109, 1136 &
n.135 (2012) [hereinafter Solimine, Path of Reapportionment Litigation].
179. Ansolabehere & Snyder, supra note 172, at 170–72. A similar pattern
occurred a decade later when Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was decided.
See Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Effects on Reciprocal Legitimation
in the Federal Courts, 70 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 105, 115–17 (2017)
(discussing effects of Roe coming to the Court on direct appeal, and other cases
challenging state abortion laws pending on direct appeal at the same time).
180. Solimine, Path of Reapportionment Litigation, supra note 178, at 1138 &
n.143.
181. Richard C. Cortner, The Apportionment Cases 192 (1970). Whether
intended by the Court or not, the rapidity of decisions likely had the effect
of diluting opposition to the resulting reapportionment of federal and state
legislative districts in many states, since it took place almost all at once
in the mid-1960s. Solimine, Path of Reapportionment Litigation, supra
note 178, at 1136. Indeed, by a variety of measures the decisions requiring
reapportionment were quickly accepted by interested publics. Id. at 1116–
17. Thus, it might be said that the very process of direct appeals contributed to public acceptance of the decisions.
182. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2501 (2019).
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Rights Act183 or alleged political gerrymandering.184 In the Court’s
recent Rucho v. Common Cause185 decision, it definitively held that the
latter type of claims were non-justiciable. The majority per Chief
Justice John Roberts argued that political gerrymandering lacked an
“objective measure” for courts to apply, unlike the one-person-one-vote
standard.186 He further argued that the Court would need to deal with
complicated issues of how one political party was unfairly (or not)
treated in redistricting.187 Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts, who has suggested that in these cases the Court has some obligation to decide direct
appeals,188 had concerns with the possibility of the Court hearing frequent direct appeals of political gerrymandering suits (no matter who
won below). This might, unfairly as Roberts would see it, constantly
suggest to the public that the Court was simply another politicized
institution in a polarized time.189
Contrast Roberts’s apparent concern in 2019 with direct appeals of
reapportionment cases in the 1960s and 1970s. It is difficult to say it
was not a polarized time; certainly the Warren Court in general didn’t
lack for political controversy and opposition.190 There, the Court was
183. E.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (developing a multi-factor
test to apply the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
Thornburg is an example of a three-judge district court case, 590 F. Supp.
345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), where both constitutional and VRA claims were
litigated and decided. See supra note 129.
184. E.g., Vieth v. Jubilirer, 541 U.S. 267, 282–283 (2004).
185. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
186. Id. at 2501.
187. Id. at 2499–502.
188. See supra note 155.
189. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (“[I]ntervention [into partisan gerrymandering]
would be unlimited in scope and duration—it would recur over and over
again around the country with each new round of districting, for state as
well as federal representatives.”). See also Douglas & Solimine, supra note
64, at 415 (pointing out that Roberts made this point, with an added reference
to direct appeals, during oral argument in Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018), a political gerrymandering case that was remanded for further proceedings after the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing); cf. David
Cole, Keeping Up Appearances, N.Y. Rev., Aug. 15, 2019, at 18, 19 (“And
while there is much to criticize in Robert’s gerrymandering decision, . . . the
strongest prudential argument in his favor is the risk that, if courts start
reviewing such claims, they would be dragged into the partisan muck.”). For
further discussion of three-judge district-court decisions and direct appeals in
this context, see Carolyn Shapiro, Docket Control, Mandatory Jurisdiction,
and the Supreme Court’s Failure in Rucho v. Common Cause, 2020 Wis.
L. Rev. 301, 305–13; Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Loyalty and the
Design of Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication in the Federal Courts,
14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 171, 179–93 (2020).
190. Powe, supra note 102, at 494–97 (discussing opposition to Warren Court
decisions).
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apparently less concerned about the prospect of frequent direct appeals.
But of course, the difference was a relatively easy-to-apply legal standard, coupled with popular support (or at worst indifference) to the
Reapportionment Revolution, as compared to the Court’s decisions on
race and criminal procedure.191 In that environment, perhaps the
Warren Court, while expressing overall concerns with the convening of
three-judge district courts and the resulting burdens of direct appeals
(as did the Burger Court starting in 1969), was willing to use or tolerate
these institutions for this area of law.
We don’t want to press the point too far. As we read them, none
of the Court’s reapportionment decisions or opinions by individual
Justices, starting with Colegrove, explicitly suggest concern with a large
number of direct appeals from such litigation (or, for that matter, comment about that litigation being brought before three-judge district
courts). Moreover, the apportionment exception to the 1976 legislation
seems to undercut the notion that reapportionment cases from the
1960s were relatively noncontroversial. As a general matter they arguably were so, but the Congressional drafters, at least, had concerns about
the reaction to such decisions from state legislatures, and the perceived
bias of a single district judge associated with one political party.192
We cannot know for sure, but at least in the lower courts, reapportionment decisions since Baker v. Carr may have been even more
controversial and politically charged had they not been litigated before
three-judge district courts. While Roberts’s implicit concern with a
large number of direct appeals in some politically charged reapportion-

191. Solimine, Path of Reapportionment Litigation, supra note 178, at 1114 & n.28.
It is worth adding that the Solicitor General of the United States (SG) filed
arguably influential amicus curiae briefs supporting the plaintiffs in many
reapportionment cases, including Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, and its progeny, Solimine, Path of Reapportionment Litigation, supra note 178, at 1120–
30, but not in the political gerrymandering cases, id. at 1128 n.101. The SG
filed no amicus brief in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
192. See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. Michael Mullen, a participant in the legislative process culminating in the 1976 Act, observes that
there was concern that, absent retention of the three-judge court, a decision
(including findings of fact) “might be skewed if the case was heard by a single
judge picked by lottery in a multi-judge US district court [either a very liberal
or a very conservative district judge]—so the State’s new Congressional map
would or might reflect a roll of the dice.” Mullen E-mail, supra note 66
(brackets in original). For further discussion of forum- and judge-shopping
by litigants in these cases, see Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1705, 1726–29 (1993); Lisa
Marshall Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of
Democratic Design, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 563, 588–96 (2013); Solimine, Voting
Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 101–04.
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ment cases is not irrational, he may have underappreciated the potential ameliorative impact of the litigation of those cases before three
judges, rather than one, in the first instance.193
To make the same point a somewhat different way, perhaps Roberts
did not undervalue the ameliorative impact of the three-judge court in
this context. Rather, what was a virtue to the Warren Court was a vice
to the Roberts Court. The former may have affirmatively used the
many direct appeals from such courts to quickly set national precedents,
even at the cost of the Court being viewed as partisan. The Roberts
Court, in contrast, may have seen it as a negative to be frequently in
the news in this regard, even at the expense of uniformity on this issue
(indeed, Rucho removed federal courts from the process entirely).194
2.

Judicial Abstention

The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts should exercise discretion to decline to proceed (i.e., abstain) with certain cases
that otherwise satisfy all procedural and jurisdictional prerequisites,
based on federalism concerns.195 Abstention may be appropriate if the
federal case would interfere with state-court proceedings, as long as
federal issues can be raised in those courts, or if state courts should be
given the initial opportunity to resolve potentially dispositive issues of
state law.196 This deference to state-court proceedings is usually referenced in leading Supreme Court decisions, most notably Younger v.

193. One of the problems in studying reapportionment decisions, and their political
valence, is that it’s not always clear how maps of legislative districts,
reviewed by or redrawn at the behest of federal judges, are “liberal” or
“conservative,” or more precisely help one political party or the other (or
neither). Mullen E-mail, supra note 66; Solimine, Path of Reapportionment
Litigation, supra note 178, at 1143–44. For studies of partisan decisionmaking by members of three-judge district courts in these cases, attempting to deal with these methodological issues, see Randall D. Lloyd,
Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research: Reapportionment
in the U.S. District Courts, 89 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 413 (1995) (study of
decisions between 1964 and 1983); Mark Jonathan McKenzie, The Influence
of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the
Federal Courts, 65 Pol. Rsch. Q. 799, 799 (2012) (study of decisions
between 1981 and 2007).
194. We thank Lael Weinberger for his thoughtful comments on these points
and elsewhere in the Article.
195. Zambrano, supra note 51, at 2119.
196. R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); Fallon
et al., supra note 21, at 1127–71.
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Harris197 from 1971, though many abstention cases preceded and came
after that decision.198
Both the three-judge district-court statute and the abstention
doctrines can be traced to reactions, by Congress and federal judges,
respectively, to the impact of Ex parte Young. That case, permitting
federal court interference with state regulatory functions, raised tensions with (among other things) traditional state prerogatives to enforce
criminal law.199 Abstention doctrines can also be traced to advancing
the substantive regulatory agenda of the Progressive and New Deal
eras, by reducing the potential for federal-court invalidation of state
law.200 The Supreme Court’s fidelity to abstention has waxed and
waned: seemingly downplayed in the aftermath of Ex parte Young, it
found greater currency from the 1920s to the 1950s, was again cut back
by the Warren Court during the Civil Rights era, and finally resurrected at the end of that era in Younger.201
Not unlike reapportionment, the history of abstention is bound up
with the history of the three-judge district court. Many of the Court’s
leading cases were direct appeals from three-judge panels.202 Consider
197. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
198. For an overview of Younger abstention, see Fallon et al., supra note 21,
at 1127–71. Another important abstention doctrine came from Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., which held that a federal court
should abstain if the case might be resolved by having state courts resolve
uncertain issues of state law. 312 U.S. at 501 (reviewing a direct appeal
from a three-judge district court). Justice Felix Frankfurter, the author
of Pullman and thus a founder of abstention, was, coincidentally or not,
a critic of the need for a three-judge district court in general. See Zambrano,
supra note 51, at 2119–20; Currie, supra note 9, at 58; Solimine, Congress,
Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 120 n.100; Lael Weinberger, Frankfurter,
Abstention Doctrine, and the Development of Modern Federalism: A
History and Three Futures, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1737, 1769 & n.170 (2020).
199. Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 Harv. L.
Rev. 2283, 2289–91 (2018).
200. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm:
Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 679, 692, 704 n.73 (1999); Ann Woolhandler, Between the Acts:
Federal Court Abstention in the 1940s and ‘50s, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.
211, 212–13 (2014).
201. Smith, supra note 199, at 2289–96 (tracing the evolution of Younger-type
abstention).
202. See, e.g., three decisions cited and quoted in Younger, 401 U.S. at 45–46
(first citing Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926), aff’g 3 F.2d 674 (N.D.
Ga. 1925) (three-judge court); then citing Spielman Motor Sales Co. v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (affirming three-judge district court from
S.D.N.Y.); and then citing Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941), aff’g 34
F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Fla. 1940) (three-judge court)). Not all of the
prominent Court decisions on abstention were from direct appeals. E.g.,
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), aff’g 130 F.2d 652 (3d
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the most prominent decision from the Warren Court in 1965,
Dombrowski v. Pfister.203 That case carved out an apparently robust
exception to the abstention doctrine, based on allegations of bad-faith
prosecution and, relatedly, enforcement of overbroad state laws impinging on free expression.204 There, civil-rights organizations sued in federal
court in Louisiana, seeking to enjoin laws of that state that limited
political activism under the guise of regulation of subversive activity.205
They had been, among other things, served with subpoenas and threatened with prosecution.206
A three-judge district court was convened. The majority, invoking
familiar abstention principles, denied the injunction request and held
that the federal defenses could be raised in state-court proceedings.207
Showing open skepticism of a robust role for federal courts in regulating
state enforcement of criminal law, the majority stated that “[a] threejudge federal court should not be used as a vehicle to enjoin future
enforcement of state statutes . . . .”208 The Fifth Circuit Judge assigned
to the panel, John Minor Wisdom, dissented at length, emphasizing
that Congress had “instituted [the three-judge district court] for just

Cir. 1942). And not all Court decisions in the pre-civil rights era ordered
abstention. Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions:
The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 636, 642–43 (1979).
According to Laycock, between Ex parte Young and Douglas, the Supreme
Court decided ninety-four cases on the merits where an injunction was
sought against enforcement of a state law, and the Court ordered the
injunction in over one-third of those cases. Id. An appreciable number of
those cases were on direct appeal from three-judge district courts. See,
e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), aff’g 30 F. Supp. 470 (M.D.
Pa. 1939) (three-judge court); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), aff’g
219 F. 273 (D. Ariz. 1915) (three-judge court); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943), rev’d 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (three-judge court);
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), rev’d 297 F. 307
(N.D. Ohio 1924) (three-judge court). Between Douglas and Dombrowski,
the Supreme Court “ordered or affirmed at least” fifty-six district court
decisions concerning injunctive or declaratory relief against state laws.
Laycok, supra, at 649. An appreciable number of those were on direct appeal
from three-judge district courts. Id. at 649–50 nn.92–100 (citing such cases).
203. 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103,
1103 (1977).
204. Smith, supra note 199, at 2296–300.
205. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. La. 1964) (three-judge
court).
206. Id. at 564–565.
207. Id. at 561.
208. Id. The majority also dismissively referred to “the flanking movement” of
suing before a three-judge district court to litigate federal limits on state
criminal-law enforcement, as opposed to doing so in the state courts themselves. Id. at 561 n.2.
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such a case.”209 The abstention doctrine was distinguishable, he argued,
because even those cases had held that deference to state courts was
not appropriate when there were “exceptional circumstances,” and
because the doctrine should be given “a narrow reading in civil rights
cases.”210
Judge Wisdom’s arguments were largely adopted by the Supreme
Court.211 There the Court, in an opinion by Justice William Brennan,
held that the district court should not have abstained, because the
abstention doctrine was “inappropriate for cases such as the present
one where . . . statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging
protected activities.”212 Dombrowski soon came to be understood as
establishing that the abstention doctrine had little if any effect in cases
involving First Amendment rights or arguably bad-faith prosecutions.213
That understanding is reflected in the circumstances that led to
Younger. In that case, California had indicted Harris for handing out
leaflets which allegedly advocated violent political change, purportedly
in violation of the state’s Criminal Syndicalism Act.214 Harris filed suit
to enjoin the prosecution in federal court, on the basis that the law
violated the First Amendment, and a three-judge district court was
convened.215 That court acknowledged that abstention principles would
ordinarily call for the federal court to defer in lieu of the defense being
209. Id. at 572 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 583. As observed by Fred Smith, “[l]ower federal court judges in the
American South had an outsized role in shaping . . . exceptions” to abstention. Smith, supra note 199, at 2296. These included Fifth Circuit Judges
Wisdom of Louisiana, Richard Rives of Alabama, and Elbert Tuttle of
Georgia. Id. All three judges served on various high-profile three-judge
district courts during the 1950s and 60s, and in the instance of Judge Tuttle,
played an apparently strategic role in picking the additional members of
such courts during the civil-rights era. Jonathan L. Entin, The Sign of
“The Four”: Judicial Assignment and the Rule of Law, 68 Miss. L.J. 369,
369 (1998); Solimine, Voting Rights Litigation, supra note 36, at 110–12.
211. Smith, supra note 199, at 2299.
212. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 489–90. Justices Black and Stewart did not
participate, and Harlan and Clark dissented. Id. at 498.
213. Powe, supra note 102, at 282–83; Glennon, supra note 132, at 925–27.
Glennon argues that the “legal profession greeted Dombrowski as a revolutionary departure [from prior abstention cases]. Legal commentators and
civil rights lawyers understood Dombrowski as a strategic tool that helped
to short-circuit state harassment of civil rights activists. Most lower court
decisions following Dombrowski involved civil rights demonstrators.” Id.
at 926 & n.404. See also Laycock, supra note 202, at 640–41 (discussing
generally how Dombrowski was understood).
214. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 508–509 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (threejudge court).
215. Id.
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raised in state court.216 But the court, not irrationally, read Dombrowski
as carving out an exception “when the criminal statute inherently has
a limiting effect upon free expression and when, as here, it is susceptible
to unduly broad application.”217 That law had been famously upheld by
the Supreme Court in 1927 in Whitney v. California,218 but the court
did not find that determinative. Rather, the court found that four
decades of intervening decisions by the Supreme Court had expanded
First Amendment protection for Harris’ advocacy, such that it was “no
longer bound by Whitney,” and that the law was unconstitutionally
broad on its face, thus entitling Harris to injunctive relief.219
In what has become the best-known abstention decision, the
Supreme Court, in an 8–1 opinion by Justice Hugo Black, disagreed.

216. Id. at 510. The court observed that Harris had unsuccessfully sought writs
of prohibition from the California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court to
prevent the pending prosecution, showing that he had not “ignored the
state courts in seeking to assert their constitutional claims, although [he]
presumably would have had a right to do so and come directly here.” Id.
217. Id. The court read the later decision of Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241
(1967) (Brennan, J.), as endorsing a broad reading of Dombrowski. Younger,
281 F. Supp. at 510–11. That reading was understandable, since Zwickler
reversed a three-judge district court which, in a case involving the First
Amendment rights of political campaigners, had narrowly construed the
“special circumstances” language of Dombrowski. Zwickler v. Koota, 261
F. Supp. 985, 992–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (per curiam). The Supreme Court
disagreed and reversed. Zwickler, 389 U.S. at 254–55.
218. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
219. Younger, 281 F. Supp. at 511, 516–17. Unlike in the lower court opinion
in Dombrowski, there was no explicit discussion of the role of the threejudge district court. Id. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 561
(E.D. La. 1964) (explicit discussion). However, when concluding that it
was not bound by Whitney, the court referenced Barnette v. West Virginia
State Board of Education, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 1942) (threejudge court), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Younger, 281 F. Supp. at 516 n.2.
In a similar fashion to Younger, the three-judge court in Barnette held it
was not bound by the Supreme Court’s decision only two years earlier in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). Barnette v.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp at 253. Indeed, the Supreme
Court overruled Gobitis when it affirmed the lower court in Barnette. W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). The inference
might be that a three-judge district court stands special among lower
courts and has some greater authority to reconsider when it is bound by
Supreme Court precedent. See Douglas & Solimine, supra note 64, at 431
n.118; see also Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 718 n.2 (M.D. Ala.)
(three-judge court) (Lynne, J., dissenting) (criticizing the lower-court decision
in Barnette on this point), aff’d, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Colegrove v. Green,
64 F. Supp. 632, 634 (N.D. Ill.) (per curiam) (three-judge court) (stating that
it disagreed with Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932), a similar reapportionment case which held (5-4) for the defendant, but as an “inferior court”
was it bound by that decision and held for the defendants), aff'd, 328 U.S.
549 (1946).
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The decision “purported to break little new ground.”220 But it was
significant in reaffirming that, as a matter of comity and traditional
principles of equity, federal courts should not ordinarily enjoin pending
state criminal proceedings when defendants had the opportunity to
raise their federal constitutional rights.221 The Court also reaffirmed the
exceptions to abstention, but overtly construed them narrowly, especially as they had been applied in Dombrowski. The latter decision was
essentially limited to its facts.222 Thus, the lower court was simply
wrong to conclude that there was virtually a free-expression exception
to abstention. That doctrinal shift, coupled with the opinion’s “soaring
federalist rhetoric,” helped establish “its special place in the federal
courts canon.”223 Scholars have traced that shift to several causes:
significant shifts in the nation’s political and legal environment; Nixon
appointees Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun having succeeded Earl
Warren and Abe Fortas on the Court; palpable backlash, jurisprudentially and politically, against Warren Court expansions of federal rights;
and that concerns about state judiciaries and criminal justice systems
had faded.224 What came to be called “Younger abstention” itself
expanded in the 1970s in a series of Court decisions applying Younger
to varying criminal, and even civil, litigation in state court.225
What role, if any, did the three-judge district court play in the
development of Younger abstention? The Court itself said relatively
little in these decisions about the institution of the three-judge court.226
220. Smith, supra note 199, at 2293.
221. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971)
222. Id. at 47–49.
223. Smith, supra note 199, at 2293. Smith particularly refers to Justice Black’s
invocation of “Our Federalism” as a rationale. Id. at 2295 (quoting Younger,
401 U.S. at 44–45). Surely contributing to the perceived significance of
the decision was that the author of the lead opinion was a well-known
supporter of the Warren Court’s expansion of rights; that only Justice
Douglas dissented, while the author of Dombrowski and Zwickler concurred;
and that the Court ordered abstention in four companion cases, all direct
appeals from three-judge district courts. Weinberger, supra note 198 at
1775; Younger, 401 U.S. at 56 (Brennan, J., concurring); 401 U.S. at 58
(Douglas, J., dissenting); infra note 226.
224. Smith, supra note 199, at 2293–94.
225. See Smith, supra note 199, at 2295. For an overview of these post-Younger
decisions, see Fallon et al., supra note 21, at 1140–66.
226. The Court did speak to the issue on two occasions. In Steffel v. Thompson,
the Court held that Younger abstention did not prevent a federal court
from issuing a declaratory judgment against a threatened, but not pending,
state prosecution. 415 U.S. 452, 461, 475 (1974) (Brennan, J). In reaching
that holding, the Court discussed the history of the three-judge district
court as a limit on powers bestowed by Ex parte Young. Id. at 465–66.
The import of the discussion was not entirely clear. Cf. Bray, supra note
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Nonetheless, it is eye-opening that, as Arthur Hellman reported in his
study of the Supreme Court’s civil rights docket in the 1970 through
1976 Terms, no less than twenty-four cases involved abstention, “and
all but [three] were appeals from three-judge district courts.”227 Thus,
it appears that the direct-appeal mechanism enabled the Court to
rapidly revisit and generally expand the reach of Younger abstention in
the space of a relatively few years. Perhaps it would have done so
anyway by way of grants of certiorari, as Currie might suggest,228 but
that process would likely have been slower and of a more uncertain
outcome for expanding Younger. Another reason for frequently revisiting Younger could have been that expanding the doctrine would eventually lessen the number of direct appeals, as cases are routed in the first
instance to state courts.
Hellman presents a more nuanced analysis on the doctrinal effect
of such direct appeals. He points out that, in the Court’s docket at the
time, plaintiffs bringing civil rights actions in federal court, presenting
issues that would ordinarily be raised as defenses to state criminal prosecutions, “regularly outnumbered” appeals from such prosecutions.229
In the latter cases, “there is little occasion for anyone to invoke doctrines such as standing, ripeness, or Younger abstention.”230 In that
100, at 1098–99 (situating discussion of three-judge district court in Steffel
in that decision’s broader discussion of judicial federalism). Ironically, the
court below had not convened a three-judge district court, even though a
state law was challenged and plaintiff had sought injunctive, in addition
to declaratory, relief. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 456–457, 457 n.7. The Supreme
Court stated that it was unnecessary to convene the court, since the plaintiff
had abandoned the request for injunctive relief during the appeal. Id. The
other occasion was a year later in MTM, Inc. v. Baxley. 420 U.S. 799
(1975) (per curiam). There, the Court held that a direct appeal from a
three-judge district court did not lie when that court denied injunctive
relief on Younger abstention grounds, not on a resolution of the merits of
the constitutional claim. Id. at 804. In that instance, plaintiffs could
appeal to the circuit court. Id. at 804–05. While the Court’s precedents were
unclear on the issue, the Court held that a “broad construction” of § 1253
(authorizing direct appeals), permitting a direct appeal in these circumstances, “would be at odds with the historic congressional policy of minimizing the mandatory docket of this Court in the interest of sound judicial
administration.” Id. at 804. This holding cuts against our notion that
direct appeals from the three-judge district court enabled the Court to
rapidly expand abstention doctrines. If that were the Court’s agenda, MTM
should have come out the other way.
227. Hellman, supra note 82, at 38.
228. See supra, note 159 and accompanying text.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 40 (footnote omitted). A leading example is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
124–27 (1973) (Blackmun, J.) (discussing standing and mootness regarding
the plaintiff Roe, and holding that Younger abstention barred consideration
of the claims by an intervening physician). Justices Blackmun and apparently
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environment, Hellman suggests, the Court had greater opportunities to
address such court-access issues, themselves not totally divorced from
the underlying constitutional issues, as compared to a docket instead
largely governed by certiorari appeals.231
A final possible convergence between abstention doctrines and the
three-judge district court is the suggestion that the former made the
latter increasingly unnecessary. In the 1960s and 70s, a number of commentators made the argument on the assertion that one of the reasons
for the creation of the three-judge court was to demonstrate federalcourt deference to state political institutions. The rise of abstention
could be viewed as accomplishing that result without the cumbersome
process of assembling a three-judge court with its negative externality
of direct appeals.232 And the Burger Court’s broader agenda of limiting
intrusive injunctive relief against states can be seen as driven in part
by such injunctions issued by three-judge courts.233
There is something to this linkage; the legislative history of the
1976 Act, at the committee report level, approvingly cites Younger as
a reason that the three-judge court is no longer necessary.234 But we
think the linkage can be overstated. As we have argued, the overwhelming reason for the broad support for the 1976 Act was the perceived administrative burden of assembling the courts, and the numerous direct appeals they generated, against a backdrop of an anachronistic concern with cabining Ex parte Young-type injunctions.235 The
expansion of abstention doctrines, especially by Younger, was indeed
an additional factor, but we think only a minor one. Correlation is not
causation: while the rise of abstention in the 1970s coincided with the
some of his colleagues initially thought the case might be resolved wholly
on abstention grounds. This ground was largely ameliorated by the intervening decision of Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (holding
that § 1983 actions were an exception to the Anti–Injunction Act, though
Younger principles were left intact), rev’g 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla.
1970) (per curiam) (three-judge court). See Clarke D. Forsythe,
Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade 19–24, 361
n.5 (2013); David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality: The Right
to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade 528–29 (1994); Bob
Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme
Court 193, 196 (1979).
231. Hellman, supra note 82, at 40 & n.165. Hellman refers to court access
issues as “adjective law doctrines.” Id. at 4, 6, 40.
232. See, e.g., John E. Kennedy & Paul D. Schoonover, Federal Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief Under the Burger Court, 26 Sw. L.J. 282, 289–90
(1972); Chicago Comment, supra note 40, at 561. Some of this commentary
focused on Pullman rather than Younger abstention. E.g., Harvard Note,
supra note 80, at 302; Commentary, supra note 130, at 380.
233. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, supra note 23, at 139–40, 140 n.193.
234. S. Rep. No. 94–204, at 8 (1975).
235. See supra notes 46–69 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court’s (and much of the rest of the attentive legal establishment’s) increasing antagonism with the institution of the three-judge
district court, we don’t think that the phenomena were directly related.
3.

Judicial Capacity and Tiers of Scrutiny

As we have recounted, Andrew Coan and Tara Leigh Grove have
developed a model of Judicial Capacity that, they argue, helps explain
the Supreme Court’s development of doctrine regarding Due Process
and Equal Protection, including the period covered by our study.236
Their focus is on the familiar, if now controversial,237 tiers of scrutiny
developed by courts to evaluate challenges to those laws. Thus, Coan
argues that the large number of government laws and regulations that
arguably discriminate in some manner, and the prospect of a large
number of suits, influenced the Court to adopt a minimal-scrutiny,
rational-basis test to evaluate the constitutionality of most such laws
(absent the presence of fundamental rights or suspect classifications).238
Grove further discusses the apparent influence of the Judiciary Act
of 1925, establishing the discretionary regime of certiorari for the
Supreme Court,239 but neither she nor Coan explicitly address the
continued use of pockets of mandatory jurisdiction, especially from
three-judge district court decisions. Their model could be further refined
through the lens of direct appeals from such decisions. As Coan puts it,
the model has greater explanatory force in constitutional “domains . . .
in which the potential volume of litigation is unusually high and those
in which the Supreme Court feels compelled to grant review in an unusually large fraction of cases.”240
This closely describes the large number of direct appeals to the
Court in the 1960s and 70s. If the Court was motivated (at least in
part) by the prospect of many appeals, and further motivated by cabining the discretion of lower courts in such cases, it might have found (at
least prior to 1976) the potential avalanche of direct appeals from threejudge district courts (for challenges to both federal and state laws) to
be unnerving. Consider that for challenges under substantive due
process, several canonical decisions were handed down by the Warren
Court, reversing three-judge district courts on direct review, and setting

236. See supra Part III.A.
237. Whether and to what extent the tiers are a relatively recent (i.e., post–
WWII) jurisprudential phenomenon, and whether they are normatively
justified, has been the subject of renewed scholarly interest. See Coan,
supra note 161, at 114–15; Joel Alicea & John D. Ohlendorf, Against the
Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, Nat’l Affs., Fall 2019, at 72, 73–74;
Grove, supra note 163, at 475–476, 476 n.3, 478 & n.8.
238. Coan, supra note 161, at 130–34.
239. Grove, supra note 163, at 480–83.
240. Coan, supra note 161, at 7.
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out a deferential, easy-to-satisfy rational-basis standard of review.241 A
parallel list of cases is available for challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.242
But here, we don’t find a tight connection between those cases and
the establishment of tiers of judicial scrutiny. During the Warren and
Burger Courts, there are significant counterexamples of decisions following rational-basis scrutiny that were not direct appeals from threejudge district courts.243 Similarly, there were significant cases establishing or applying stricter scrutiny that were direct appeals from threejudge courts.244 Some of the latter cases involved issues (e.g., gender
discrimination)245 that would be expected to generate a stream of litigation. The direct-appeal gloss on the Judicial Capacity model is
further weakened by the fact that some of the decisions establishing
rational-basis scrutiny were handed down before the large number of
direct appeals in the late 1960s and early- to mid-1970s. And in its
decision-making, the Court no doubt was self-conscious of its public
efforts to restrict or eliminate the three-judge district court, and
perhaps confident those efforts would succeed.
241. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 1031–32 (1963) (state economic
regulations), rev’g 210 F. Supp. 200, 202–203 (D. Kan. 1961) (three–judge
court); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 461, 463–64, 466
(1955) (same), rev’g 120 F. Supp. 128, 135–36 (W.D. Okla. 1954) (three–
judge court).
242. E.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–16 (1976) (per curiam)
(mandatory retirement for police), rev’g 376 F. Supp. 753, 756 (D. Mass.
1974) (three–judge court); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 55, 59 (1973) (use of property tax for public-school finance),
rev’g 337 F. Supp. 280, 282–283 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam) (three–
judge court); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478, 485–86 (1970)
(state welfare regulations), rev’g 297 F. Supp. 450, 458–59 (D. Md. 1969)
(three-judge court); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802,
806–809 (1969) (right to absentee ballots), aff’g 277 F. Supp. 14, 17 (N.D.
Ill. 1967) (three-judge court); see also Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272, 275 (1979) (veterans hiring preference), rev’g 451 F.
Supp. 143, 149–50 (D. Mass. 1978) (three–judge court).
243. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 424–26 (1961) (appeal from
state courts); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 299, 303 (1976)
(per curiam), rev’g 501 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1974).
244. E.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664, 670 (1966), rev’g
240 F. Supp. 270, 270–71 (E.D. Va. 1964) (per curiam) (three–judge
court); Kramer v. Union Free Schl. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622, 626–
28 (1969), rev’g 282 F. Supp. 70, 71, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (three–judge
court). One might also argue that the three–judge district-court regime led
to the establishment of the strict-scrutiny standard, since it too empowers
lower courts by establishing a relatively bright–line rule for certain types
of cases. See Grove, supra note 163, at 489–90.
245. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192, 197, 199 (1976) (establishing intermediate standard of review for gender discrimination), rev’g 399 F. Supp.
1304, 1307–09 (W.D. Okla. 1975) (three–judge court).
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To be sure, neither Coan nor Grove claim that the Judicial Capacity model is the sole reason for the Court’s creation of tiers of scrutiny;
only that it is one, largely overlooked factor.246 In this we concur. But
we further conclude that, to the extent the Judicial Capacity model has
explanatory force, the presence or absence of direct appeals from threejudge districts adds only conflicting variables to the model.247
C.

Contemporary Impact: National Injunctions and Returning to
Mandatory Jurisdiction

So far in this section, we have mainly focused on the impact of the
three-judge district court on doctrinal developments in the 1960s and
1970s. Here, we consider what lessons might be drawn from that history
for two contemporary controversies.
One is the issuance by district judges of nationwide injunctions
against the enforcement of federal law. Numerous commentators, echoing Senator Overman’s long-ago disdain for a “little” federal judge exercising considerable power,248 have been openly incredulous that only one
judge should be able to issue an order immediately binding the entire
country.249 Some commentators have proposed that only a three-judge
district court should be able to issue such injunctions.250
Yet it is hardly clear that a three-judge district court would achieve
the result sought by critics of nationwide injunctions. The reform might
246. Coan, supra note 161, at 40–46 (discussing legalist, attitudinal, and strategic
models as alternative explanations for the Court’s decisions); Grove, supra
note 163, at 477.
247. A counterargument could be premised on the notion that the “early 1970s
was a period of great ferment in the development of equal protection doctrine”
at the Supreme Court. Earl M. Maltz, The Burger Court and the Conflict
over the Rational Basis Test: The Untold Story of Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 39 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 264, 264 (2014). The numerous
direct appeals from three–judge district courts in this period, especially,
though not only, of lower-court decisions which had held that there was a
violation of equal protection, see supra notes 243 & 245, provided an opportunity for that ferment.
248. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., John Fund, Why Should a Single Federal Judge Be Able to Make
Law for the Whole Country?, Nat’l Rev. (July 8, 2018, 6:27 PM), https://
www.nationalreview.com/2018/07/federal-district-judges-should-not-makeimmigration-law-for-whole-country [https://perma.cc/3N3Y-YAXS]; Aaron
Blake, The Rise of Solo Judges Nixing Nationwide Policies, Wash. Post
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/20/nationwideinjunctions-trump-biden/ [https://perma.cc/4U65-NEHV] (Apr. 20, 2022,
8:56 A.M. EDT) (nationwide injunctions have “spurred a discussion about
whether it’s good for our system of government for individual judges to wield
such power so frequently.”).
250. See supra note 71. See also Cushman, supra note 40, at 1047 (arguing that
“ironically” Congress curtailed the three-judge district court in 1976 “just
as the universal injunction was emerging as a phenomenon”).
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backfire in several ways. The mere fact that three judges, rather than
one, would be convened to consider the issuance of such an injunction
might lead to more thoughtful reflection, but it could cut different ways.
Three judges might be more willing to than just one to take the controversial step of issuing a nationwide injunction in a high-profile case.
This could be true even if we assume that there would be a direct appeal
to the Supreme Court. Similarly, given a direct-appeal mechanism, the
three-judge court might feel that it is free of the constraints of its geographic circuit,251 and is under less restraint to take normal geographic
limits of a district judge’s jurisdiction into account when deciding
whether to issue a national injunction.252
The other recent matter is calls for the revival of the long-sincecurtailed mandatory jurisdiction for the Supreme Court, not just for
three-judge district court decisions. In 2021, President Joseph Biden
signed an executive order creating a presidential commission on the
Supreme Court, which among other things was directed to reconsider
the Court’s case selection processes.253 Concerns with the considerable
discretion the certiorari process gives to the Supreme Court are nothing
new.254 Those concerns have now been renewed by commentators from
a variety of ideological perspectives and reasons. For example, Jack
Balkin has argued that the Court should have less control over its
docket as a way to depoliticize the appointment process.255 The certiorari process, he contends, enables the Court to lessen its docket, but
at the cost of increasing the perceived importance of the fewer cases it
does decide, and hence increases the polarization of the Court as a

251. See supra note 135.
252. It is perhaps not entirely irrelevant that the Supreme Court decision that
allowed for the possibility of a nationwide injunction was on appeal from
a three–judge district court. See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors:
Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 439–40 (2017)
(discussing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968), rev’g Flast v. Gardner,
271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (three–judge court)).
253. President Biden to Sign Executive Order Creating the Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States, White House (Apr.
9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2021/04/09/president-biden-to-sign-executive-order-creating-the-presidentialcommission-on-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/
9J7Z-5HBV]. The Commission’s final report made no explicit recommendations to change the Court’s case selection process. See Presidential
Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States, Final
Report (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/
12/SCOTUS-Report-Final-12.8.21-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JNK7-F5D2].
254. See, e.g., Edward A. Harnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy–Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1643,
1713–37 (2000) (discussing tension between certiorari process and rule-oflaw concerns).
255. Jack Balkin, The Cycles of Constitutional Time 151–52, 154 (2020).
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whole.256 Similarly, other commentators call for limiting certiorari, and
presumably increasing mandatory appeals, to limit the Court’s selfimportance257 or its strategic behavior.258
These commentators are usually not clear on how the current
certiorari process should be changed. Most do not explicitly argue that
all cases previously governed by certiorari should be the subject of
mandatory appeals. But short of that, which cases should be the subject
of mandatory appeals, or at least something different than certiorari?
One reformer has advocated that randomly selected panels of circuit
judges decide which cases the Supreme Court should decide.259 Another
variation might leave certiorari intact for most cases, but return to
some version of the pre-1976 era, with mandatory appeals for certain
categories of cases. Such appeals could be from the Court of Appeals,
as compared to direct appeals from trial courts (whether three-judge or
otherwise).
Whatever models might be advocated, the experience of the
Supreme Court with direct appeals from three-judge district courts in
the last century suggests that the Court is apt to resist mandatory
appeals, for largely the same reasons of sound judicial administration
(as the Court perceives it). That experience also suggests that the
Court’s opposition would be nonideological in nature. Even if more
mandatory appeals were enacted, the Court might simply revive its old

256. Id. at 154–55.
257. Melody Wang, How to Fix the Supreme Court: Don’t Let the Court
Choose Its Cases, N.Y. Times, (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html [https://perma.
cc/F5WY-2YGH].
258. Matthew J. Franck, The Problem of Judicial Supremacy, Nat’l Affs.,
Spring 2016, at 137, 147–49 (arguing that Court set up its decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges by previously denying certiorari in prior appeals that
also raised the validity of state bans on same–sex marriage); see also Aziz
Huq & Darrell A.H. Miller, How to Safeguard Progressive Legislation
Against the Supreme Court: Poison Pills, Wash. Post, (Oct. 26, 2020, 6:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/26/supremecourt-conservative-barrett-progressive-poison-pill/ [https://perma.cc/QHV426PP] (discussing various strategies for progressive legislators to limit the
review of a conservative Court, including adding a provision to legislation
that, if ruled unconstitutional, would trigger “a fallback provision that
would eliminate the justices’ discretion over which cases to hear.”); Daniel
Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, The Future of Supreme Court Reform, 134
Harv. L. Rev. F. 398, 406 (2021).
259. Wang, supra note 257. This proposal closely resembles one advocated in
the Freund Report, supra note 159, at 590–95, at a time when the Court
was deciding far more cases than now, in part due to more mandatory
appeals. Even so, those recommendations “met a predominately critical
response” though “variations have subsequently” been advocated by others.
Fallon et al., supra note 21, at 47 n.188.
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practice of summarily disposing of such appeals. If so, the modern
reformers are apt to be disappointed in the efficacy of the reforms.

Conclusion
Fifty years ago, the American Law Institute study, quoting David
Currie, stated that it was “important to hold in mind that ‘the threejudge provisions, despite their bland and technical phrasing, are products of battles between competing political forces over four persistent
and significant issues: judicial review, national supremacy, sovereign
immunity, and the use of the injunction.’”260 We, too, kept in mind
competing political forces, broadly defined, as we investigated the use
of the three-judge district court in the federal system during a particularly tumultuous period of American history. That period began with
the Warren Court, traversed much of the modern Civil Rights era, and
ended when Congress significantly limited the types of cases litigated
before those courts. It included the 1960s and 70s when large numbers
of such courts were convened each year at the district level, and much
of the Court’s docket was filled by direct appeals of those cases. While
the three-judge district court had not gone unnoticed in the scholarship
on federal courts in general, or that of the 1956–1976 era, before our
study that work was limited in various ways.
To provide a more comprehensive study, we created a database of
all officially published three-judge district decisions involving constitutional challenges to a constitutional provision or statute of a state. Our
primary focus was on the outcome of the decision, as well as its fate in
the Supreme Court, if the losing party filed a direct appeal. Our results
were not startling. They largely confirmed what anecdotal and limited
empirical evidence had suggested for the era we studied: among the
findings were that, on the whole, three-judge courts held for plaintiffs
in about half of the cases; almost 50% of the decisions were the subject
of a direct appeal to the Supreme Court; the Court in turn decided
about 36% of those on the merits, while summarily disposing of over
40%.
We also placed those large numbers and dispositions, at trial and
on appeal, in a broader institutional context, attempting to discern why
so many and what types of such cases were brought, tying them to the
legal strategies of plaintiffs in the Civil Rights era. Our focus was less
on the legal analysis of the decisions or situating them in broader
doctrinal trends. In the latter portion of the Article, we did suggest how
the institution of the three-judge district court did make a difference
on certain substantive issues, as compared to how those issues might
have played out if the three-judge court had not existed.

260. ALI Study, supra note 51, at 318 (quoting Currie, supra note 9, at 3).
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What does our study have to say about the current, continued use
of the three-judge district court for reapportionment cases and constitutional challenges to a small number of federal statutes? Considering the
strong preference for trial courts staffed by individual judges in the
United States, in both the federal and state systems, it is perhaps
surprising that the three-judge court has not been entirely abolished.
The origins of the court, responsive to the once-controversial, now
venerable decision of Ex parte Young,261 are a distant memory. Yet even
the ALI study, while calling for major curtailment of the court’s jurisdiction fifty years ago, stated that, in cases of “great public moment,”
the three-judge court can be supportable since “[t]he moral authority
of a federal court order is likely to be maximized if the result cannot be
laid to the prejudices or political ambitions of a single district judge.”262
Consider too the recent federal court challenges to partisan gerrymandering. Those were initially brought before and decided by threejudge district courts, and arguably would have been the type of case,
per the ALI Study, where a three-judge court would have particularly
suited concerns about the partisan affiliation of a single federal judge.263
As we noted, the Supreme Court in 2019 put that experiment to an end
before the laboratory of the federal court system had fully tested it.264
But for now, the three-judge court will live on for other reapportionment cases, and certain challenges to federal statutes. The history of
the three-judge court will remain to be told.

261. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
262. ALI Study, supra note 51, at 320.
263. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 Ann.
Rev. Pol. Sci. 261, 262 (2019).
264. See supra Part III.B.1. The experiment continues on in the state courts of
North Carolina, which adopted a three-judge trial court in 2014 to initially
hear constitutional challenges to state statutes. See Joshua A. Yost,
Comment, “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It”: Evaluating North Carolina’s
Creation of a Three–Judge Court to Hear Constitutional Challenges to
State Law, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1893, 1895 (2015).
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Methodological Appendix
This appendix provides additional detail on the methodology of our
empirical study, as initially addressed in Part II(A) of the article.
Database of Three-Judge District Court Decisions

We studied three-judge district court decisions in the federal courts,
handed down between January 1, 1954 and December 31, 1976, regarding constitutional challenges, under the U.S. Constitution, to state
constitutional provisions and state laws. We did not study other types
of cases adjudicated before such courts in the time period in question,
namely constitutional challenges to federal statutes, certain types of
antitrust cases, appeals of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and preclearance actions under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
While the three-judge district court had been subject to some
limited empirical study, there was, as far as we knew, no comprehensive
pre-existing database of such decisions for the period in question, from
any public or private source. Hence, we needed to create our own
database. While several online sources of decisions were available, we
decided to use Westlaw. Westlaw itself has no specific keyword or link
to three-judge district court decisions as such, so we used several
searches to identify the decisions in which we were interested. The
decisions are limited to officially published decisions in the Federal
Supplement (F. Supp.) and Federal Rules Decisions (F.R.D.).265 The
searches yielded 885 decisions.
Apart from excluding officially unpublished decisions, due to the
vagaries of Westlaw and searches thereof, we cannot say for certain
that our database includes all relevant decisions from the period in
question. But we are confident that we have systematically assembled
a very large fraction of the relevant decisions in our database. A list of
the decisions and citations is posted at www.law.uc.edu/directory/
faculty/michael-e-solimine/three-judge-district-court-database.
Coding of Decisions

Eight students at the University of Cincinnati College of Law coded
each decision on the following potentially applicable variables.266
1. case name
2. citation in the Federal Supplment
3. U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals where district court convened
265. The searches are collected and discussed in E-mail with Attached Documents
from Matthew Allen to Michael E. Solimine (Wednesday, March 2, 2016,
6:56pm) (on file with Solimine). We are particularly appreciative of the
substantial contributions of Matt, a 2016 graduate of the University of
Cincinnati College of Law, to this project.
266. For more details on these variables, see Michael Solimine & James
Walker, Codebook for Three–Judge District Court Study (January 2017)
(available from Solimine and posted on his law-school webpage).
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4. U.S. District Court where district court convened
5. year of decision
6. composition of court (2 district judges and one circuit judge, or
two circuit judges and one district judge)
7. names of judges
8. author of lead decision, or if none, indication of unsigned, per
curiam opinion
9. author of any concurring and/or dissenting opinions
10. characterization of lead plaintiff (i.e., individual, business,
interest group, other)
11. characterization of lead defendant (i.e., state attorney general,
other)
12. primary subject of the suit (i.e., racial discrimination; economic
regulation; free expression; religion; 14th Amendment claims
other than race; voting rights; other)
13. whether injunctive or other relief (e.g., a declaratory judgment)
was awarded to the plaintiff
14. if no relief was awarded to the plaintiff, basis of decision (i.e.,
merits of plaintiff’s claims; procedural or other non-merits
reasons; other)
15. if there was a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court
16. if there was a direct appeal, the disposition of that appeal (i.e.,
summarily affirmed or reversed; affirmed or reversed with an
explanatory opinion; dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; other).
Two more students, under the direction of one of the authors, subsequently checked and, when necessary, corrected the initial coding of
each case by the first wave of student coders.
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